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a b s t r a c t
A logic-enriched type theory (LTT) is a type theory extended with a primitive mechanism
for forming and proving propositions. We construct two LTTs, named LTT0 and LTT∗0 , which
we claim correspond closely to the classical predicative systems of second order arithmetic
ACA0 and ACA. We justify this claim by translating each second order system into the
corresponding LTT, and proving that these translations are conservative. This is part of
an ongoing research project to investigate how LTTs may be used to formalise different
approaches to the foundations of mathematics.
The two LTTs we construct are subsystems of the logic-enriched type theory LTTW,
which is intended to formalise the classical predicative foundation presented by Herman
Weyl in his monograph Das Kontinuum. The system ACA0 has also been claimed to
correspond toWeyl’s foundation. By casting ACA0 and ACA as LTTs, we are able to compare
themwith LTTW. It is a consequence of the work in this paper that LTTW is strictly stronger
than ACA0.
The conservativity proof makes use of a novel technique for proving one LTT
conservative over another, involving defining an interpretation of the stronger system out
of the expressions of the weaker. This technique should be applicable in a wide variety of
different cases outside the present work.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A lot of research in the field of mathematical logic has been devoted to constructing formal theories intended to capture
various schools of thought in the foundations of mathematics. In particular, the project of Reverse Mathematics [12] has
provided an extremely detailed analysis of many theories in the language of second order arithmetic L2. It has been argued
that the theories studied correspond closely to different foundational schools; in particular, that the classical, predicative
foundation presented by Hermann Weyl in his monograph Das Kontinuum [15] is captured by the theory ACA0 [8].
The systems of logic known as dependent type theories have also received a lot of attention, and in particular have proven
to offer many practical benefits when used as the basis of the computer systems known as proof checkers or proof assistants.
Type theories divide the world of mathematical objects into types. They offer much more expressive power than second
order arithmetic: we are able to speak, not just of natural numbers and sets of natural numbers, but also about (e.g.) sets of
sets, lists, trees, and functions from any of these types to any of them. However, so far, type theories have been used almost
exclusively to represent constructivemathematics.
More recently, the concept of a logic-enriched type theory has been developed. A logic-enriched type theory is a type
theory augmented with a separate, primitive mechanism for forming and proving propositions. It thus has two components
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or ‘worlds’: a type-theoretic component, consisting of objects collected into types, and a logical component, for reasoning
about these objects. LTTs have been used to investigate the relationships between type theories and set theories [1,9], and
by the present authors [3,2] to formalise the predicative foundation for mathematics presented by Hermann Weyl in Das
Kontinuum [15].
There is reason to believe that LTTsmayoffer someof the advantages of both traditional logical systems, and type theories.
They share with type theories the rich type structure and inbuilt notion of computation that have proven to be of great
benefit for formalisation in practice. At the same time, they offer the flexibility in choice of axioms that we are used to in
traditional logical systems: it is possible, for example, to add excluded middle to the logical component without changing
the type-theoretic component.
This paper is part of an ongoing research project to construct a hierarchy of LTTs, similar to the hierarchy of second order
systems in Reverse Mathematics. We hope thereby to investigate how LTTs may be used to represent different schools of
thought in the foundations of mathematics, and to understand the effect that changes in the design of an LTT have on its set
of definable objects and provable theorems.
In this paper, we construct two LTTs that capture two second order systems that are closely related to the foundation of
Das Kontinuum: ACA0 and ACA. We construct two LTTs, which we name LTT0 and LTT∗0 . These are more expressive than a
second order system: the type-theoretic component of each features types of natural numbers, pairs, functions of all orders,
and sets of all orders.
Our aim in this paper is to show that adding this expressive power is ‘safe’; that is, that we have not thereby increased
the proof-theoretic strength of the system. We do this as follows. Let us say that a proposition of LTT0 is second order iff
it uses no types other than N (the type of natural numbers) and Set (N) (the type of sets of natural numbers). We define a
translation from ACA0 onto the second order propositions of LTT0, and prove that the translation is conservative; that is, a
formula of L2 is provable in ACA0 if and only if its translation is provable in LTT0.
The current authors have previously [3,2] presented a new system intended to capture Weyl’s foundation, which we
named LTTW. We argued there that LTTW capturesWeyl’s foundation very closely, and described how all the definitions and
results in Das Kontinuum have been formalised in LTTW using a proof assistant. The two LTTs that we construct in this paper
are both subsystems of LTTW. As a consequence of the work in this paper, we now know that LTTW is strictly stronger than
ACA0, and at least as strong as ACA.
We argue that, compared with ACA0 and ACA, LTTW correspondsmore closely to the system presented in Das Kontinuum.
This is not a claim that can be proven formally, as there is no formal definition of Weyl’s foundation, but we can advance
evidence for it. In our previous paper, we pointed out the extreme similarity between the presentation in Das Kontinuum
and the definition of LTTW, and described one construction in Das Kontinuum – the construction of K(n) = {X |
X has at least n elements} – that cannot be done ‘as directly’ in any of the second order systems. Here, we strengthen the
justification for this claim: we show that K is expressed by a term in LTTW that cannot be formed in either LTT0 or LTT∗0 .
The majority of this paper is taken up with proving the conservativity results. Our method for proving the conservativity
of LTT0 over ACA0 is as follows. We first define a subsystem T2 of LTT0 which has just two types, N and Set (N). and show
that LTT0 is conservative over T2.
We then construct infinitely many subsystems of LTT0 between T2 and LTT0. We prove that, for each of these subsystems
S and T , whenever S is a subsystem of T , then T is conservative over S. We do this by defining an interpretation of the
judgements of T in terms of the expressions of S. Informally, we can think of this as giving a way of reading the judgements
of T as statements about S. We show that this interpretation satisfies two properties:
• Every derivable judgement of T is true.
• Every judgement of S that is true is derivable in S.
It follows that, if a judgement of S is derivable in T , then it is derivable in S.
The proof thus makes use of an original technique which should be of interest in its own right, and which we expect to
be applicable in a wide variety of contexts for proving one LTT or type theory conservative over another. In particular, we
shall show how it can be adapted to provide a direct proof that ACA0 is conservative over Peano Arithmetic.
1.1. Outline
In Section 2 of this paper, we describe the subsystems of second order arithmetic that we shall consider, and compare
them informally with Weyl’s system. In Section 3, we give the formal definition of LTTW and its two subsystems, and define
the translation from second order arithmetic into the LTTs. In Section 4, we prove that this translation is conservative in
the case of ACA0 and T2. In Section 5, we prove that LTT0 is conservative over T2. Finally, in Section 6, we indicate how the
proof can be modified to prove the conservativity of LTT∗0 over ACA, and discuss the possibility of constructing a subsystem
of LTTW conservative over ACA+0 , and the conservativity of ACA0 over Peano Arithmetic.
Notation. We shall stick to the following convention throughout this paper. Capital letters from the beginning of the Latin
alphabet (A, B, C, . . .) shall denote types. Capital letters from the middle (K , L,M , N, . . .) shall denote terms. Capital letters
from just after the middle (P , Q ) shall denote names of small propositions. Lower-case letters (x, y, z, . . .) shall denote
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variables, except t , which we reserve for terms of the language of second order arithmetic. Lower-case letters from the
middle of the Greek alphabet (φ, ψ , χ, . . .) shall denote propositions.
We shall be dealing with partial functions throughout this paper. We write X ' Y to denote that the expression X is
defined if and only if Y is defined, in which case they are equal. Given a function v, we write v[x := a] for the function v′
with domain dom v ∪ {x}, such that v′(x) = a, and v′(y) = v(y) for y 6= x. We write FV (X) for the set of free variables in
the expression X .
2. Background
2.1. Weyl’s Das Kontinuum
In 1918, Herman Weyl wrote the monograph Das Kontinuum [15], which presented a semi-formal system intended to
provide a predicative foundation for mathematics. Weyl’s system consists of a set of ‘principles’ by which sets, functions
and propositions may be introduced. In particular, if we have formed the proposition φ, we may introduce the set {x | φ},
provided thatφ does not involve any quantification over sets. Impredicative definitions are thus impossible inWeyl’s system.
His concern was to show how much of mathematics – in particular, how much of analysis – could still be retained under
such a restriction.
At the time of writing Das Kontinuum in 1918, Weyl agreed withWhitehead and Russell’s opinion [17] that the source of
the famous paradoxes in set theory was the presence of impredicative definitions — definitions that involved a certain kind
of vicious circle. In particular, when we introduce a set Rwith the definition
R = {x | φ} (1)
then the definition is impredicative if either x or any of the bound variables in φ ranges over a collection that includes the
set R itself.
InWeyl’s foundation,mathematical objects are divided into categories. A category can be basic or ideal. Given any category
A, there is the ideal category Set (A)1 of sets whose members are objects of category A. In a definition of the form (1), we
may only quantify over basic categories. In particular, we may not quantify over any category of the form Set (A). It is in this
manner that impredicative definitions are excluded.
If we bar impredicative definitions, we are unable to define many objects, such as the least upper bound of a bounded
set of reals. We must thus either find an alternative way to introduce these objects, or do without them. Russell and
Whitehead chose the former course, with their Axiom of Reducibility. The monograph Das Kontinuum was Weyl’s attempt
to follow the latter course: to show how much of classical mathematics could be preserved while excluding impredicative
definitions.
2.2. Subsystems of second order arithmetic
We are concerned in this paper with two subsystems of second order arithmetic, ACA0 and ACA. The letters ACA stand for
‘arithmetical comprehension axiom’. The system ACA0 is investigated in great detail in [12]. These two systems are theories
in the language of second order arithmetic, a language for describing natural numbers and sets of natural numbers. We now
introduce this language formally.
Definition 2.1 (Language of Second Order Arithmetic). The language of second order arithmetic L2 is defined as follows.
There are two countably infinite, disjoint sets of variables: the number variables x, y, z, . . . , intended to range over natural
numbers; and the set variables X , Y , Z, . . . , intended to range over sets of natural numbers.
The terms and propositions of second order arithmetic are given by the following grammar:
Term t ::= x | 0 | St | t + t | t · t
Proposition φ ::= t = t | t ∈ X | ⊥ | φ ⊃ φ | ∀xφ | ∀Xφ.
We define ¬, ∧, ∨,↔ and ∃ in terms of⊥,⊃ and ∀ as usual.
A proposition is arithmetic iff no set quantifier ∀X occurs within it.
2.2.1. ACA0
The systemACA0 has been verywell studied. In particular, it has played amajor role in the project of ReverseMathematics
[12]. It has often been argued that ACA0 is closely related to Weyl’s foundation; for example, Feferman [8] calls it ‘a modern
formulation of Weyl’s system’, and Brown and Simpson [5] write ‘ACA0 isolates the same portion of mathematical practice
which was identified as ‘predicative analysis’ by Herman Weyl in his famous monograph Das Kontinuum’.
It is known that ACA0 is conservative over Peano Arithmetic (PA); a model-theoretic proof is given in [12], and a
proof-theoretic proof can be given along the lines of Shoenfield [11]. A novel proof of this result shall be given in
Section 6.2.
1 The notation here is ours, not Weyl’s.
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The axioms of ACA0 are as follows:
• The Peano axioms — the axioms of Peano Arithmetic, minus the induction axioms:
Sx 6= 0
Sx = Sy ⊃ x = y
x+ 0 = x
x+ Sy = S(x+ y)
x · 0 = 0
x · Sy = x · y+ x.
• The arithmetical comprehension axiom schema: for every arithmetic proposition φ in which X does not occur free,
∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ φ).
• The set induction axiom: 0 ∈ X ⊃ ∀x(x ∈ X ⊃ Sx ∈ X) ⊃ ∀x.x ∈ X .
2.2.2. ACA
The system ACA is formed by extending ACA0 with the full induction axiom schema: for every proposition φ,
[0/x]φ ⊃ ∀x(φ ⊃ [Sx/x]φ) ⊃ ∀xφ.
An argument could be made for ACA being a better representation of the foundation in Das Kontinuum than ACA0, because
– as we shall argue in Section 2.3 – Weyl makes use of an induction principle that is stronger than that of ACA0.
The system ACA has not been studied in the literature as much as ACA0. A few facts about ACA are known: its proof-
theoretic ordinal is εε0 , and it can prove the consistency of ACA0. See [4] for the proof of these results and an analysis of the
set of models of ACA.
2.3. Das Kontinuum and subsystems of second order arithmetic compared
There has been quite some argument over how well Weyl’s foundation is captured by a subsystem of second order
arithmetic. Feferman [7] has argued strongly in favour of ACA0, or a system very like it, being a modern formulation of
Weyl’s system.
This argument cannot be settled formally, asWeyl did not give a formal definition of his system. However, in the authors’
view, Weyl’s system exceeds both ACA0 and ACA, for the following reasons:
1. Weyl intended his system to be more than second order. He allowed the category Set (B) to be formed for any category
B, basic or ideal. Thus, for example, we can form the categories Set (Set (N)), Set (Set (Set (N))), and so forth.
2. Weyl intended the principle of induction to apply to all propositions, arithmetic or not.
We justify this by showing a place where Weyl explicitly defines a function of category Set (Set (A)) → Set (Set (A)), and
three places where he proves a non-arithmetic proposition by induction.
The former occurs [16, p. 39] with the definition of the cardinality of a set. Weyl defines a function d : Set (Set (A)) →
Set (Set (A)) by
d(T ) = {X | ∃x ∈ X .X \ {x} ∈ T }.
This function is then iterated, to form the function dn(T ) = {X | n elements may be removed from X to form an element
of T }. Weyl goes on to argue that dn(U ) denotes the set of all sets with at least n elements (whereU is the set of all subsets
of A). He defines the proposition a(n, X), ‘X has at least n elements’, by
a(n, X) ≡ X ∈ dn(U ).
Various results about this definition are later proved [16, p. 55], such as:
If X has at least n+ 1 elements, then X has at least n elements.
This is not an arithmetic proposition (it involves quantification over X), but it is proven by induction on n.
Similarly, the non-arithmetic proposition ‘If X is a subset of E and X consists of at least n elements, then E also consists
of at least n elements’ [16, p. 56] is proven by induction, as is the lemma concerning substitution of elements [16, p. 56]: ‘If a
new object [. . .] is substituted for one of the elements of a set X which consists of at least n elements [. . .], then themodified
set X∗ also consists of at least n elements.’
Thus, Weyl’s method of defining a(n, X) involves third order sets; the application of the Principle of Iteration to third
order sets; and proof by induction of a proposition that quantifies over sets. These are all expressed by primitive constructs
in LTTW, but not in LTT0 or LTT∗0 (we discuss this point further in Section 3.2).
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When we have proven the conservativity of LTT0 and LTT∗0 over ACA0 and ACA respectively, we will have justified our
claim thatWeyl’s system is stronger than ACA0; and, if our conjecture that LTTW is stronger than LTT∗0 is correct, that Weyl’s
system is stronger than ACA.
3. Logic-enriched type theories
In this section, we introduce the logic-enriched type theory LTTW and the two subsystems with which we are concerned.
Logic-enriched type theories (LTTs) were introduced by Aczel and Gambino [1,9] to study the relationship between type
theories and set theories. An LTT is a formal system consisting of two parts: the type-theory component, which deals with
terms and types; and the logical component, which deals with propositions.
3.1. LTTW
The system LTTW is a logic-enriched type theory designed to represent the mathematical foundation given in Das
Kontinuum. It was introduced in [2,3].
3.1.1. Type-theoretic component
Its type-theoretic component has the following types.
• There is a type N of natural numbers. 0 is a natural number; and, for any natural number N , the successor of N , sN , is a
natural number.
• For any types A and B, we may form the type A× B. Its terms are pairs (M,N)A×B consisting of a termM of A and a term
N of B. For any termM : A× B, we can construct the term piA×B1 (M) denoting its first component, and the term piA×B2 (M)
denoting its second component.
• For any types A and B, we may form the type A → B of functions from A to B. Its terms have the form λx : A.M : B,
denoting the function which, given N : A, returns the term [N/x]M : B. Given M : A→ B and N : A, we may construct
the termM(N)A→B to denote the value of the functionM when applied to N .• For any type A, we may form the type Set (A) of sets of terms of A. Its terms have the form {x : A | P}, where P is a name
of a small proposition, denoting the set of allM : A for which the proposition named by [M/x]P is true.
We divide the types into small and large types, reflecting Weyl’s division of categories into basic and ideal categories.
When we introduce a set {x : A | P}, the proposition P may quantify over the small types, but not over the large types. The
small types are defined inductively by:
• N is a small type.
• If A and B are small types, then A× B is a small type.
We effect this division by introducing a type universe U , whose terms are names of the small types. There is a term Nˆ : U
which is the name ofN; and, ifM : U names A and N : U names B, then there is a termM×ˆN : U that names A×B. We write
T (M) for the type named byM .
We can also eliminate N over any family of types; that is, if A[x] is a type depending on x : N, we can define by recursion
a function f such that f (x) : A[x] for all x : N. The term
EN([x]A, L, [x, y]M,N)
is intended to denote the value f (N), where f is the function defined by recursion thus:
f (n) : [n/x]A for all n : N
f (0) = L
f (n+ 1) = [n/x, f (n)/y]M.
Remark. We choose to label the terms
(M,N)A×B, piA×B1 (M), pi
A×B
2 (M), λx : A.M : B andM(N)A×B
with the types A and B. This is for technical reasons only; it makes the interpretations we introduce in Section 5 easier to
define. We shall often omit these labels when writing terms. We shall also often writeMN forM(N).
3.1.2. Logical component
The logical component of LTTW contains propositions built up as follows:
• IfM and N are objects of the small type T (L), thenM =L N is a proposition.• ⊥ is a proposition.
• If φ and ψ are propositions, then φ ⊃ ψ is a proposition.
• If A is a type and φ a proposition, then ∀x : A.φ is a proposition.
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We define the other logical connectives as follows:
¬φ ≡ φ ⊃ ⊥
φ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(φ ⊃ ¬ψ)
φ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬φ ⊃ ψ
φ ↔ ψ ≡ (φ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ φ)
∃x : A.φ ≡ ¬∀x : A.¬φ.
We call a proposition φ small iff, for every quantifier ∀x : A that occurs in φ, the type A is a small type. We wish it to be
the case that, when we introduce a set of type Set (A), the proposition we use to do so must be a small proposition.
We achieve this by introducing a propositional universe ‘prop’, which will be the collection of names of the small
propositions. We shall introduce a new judgement form Γ ` P prop, denoting that P is the name of a small proposition, and
rules that guarantee:
• IfM and N are objects of the small type T (L), thenM =ˆL N is the name ofM =L N .
• ⊥ˆ is the name of⊥.
• If P names φ and Q names ψ , then P ⊃ˆ Q is the name of φ ⊃ ψ .
• IfM : U names the small type A and P names φ, then ∀ˆx : M.P names ∀x : A.φ.
We denote by V (P) the small proposition named by P . We shall, in the sequel, often write just ‘small proposition’ when we
should strictly write ‘name of small proposition’.
We use ‘expression’ to mean a type, term, small proposition or proposition. We identify expressions up to α-conversion.
We denote by [M/x]X the result of substituting the termM for the variable x in the expression X , avoiding variable capture.
3.1.3. Judgements and rules of deduction
A context in LTTW has the form x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, where the xis are distinct variables and each Ai is a type. There are
ten judgement forms in LTTW:
• Γ ` valid, denoting that Γ is a valid context.
• Γ ` A type, denoting that A is a well-formed type under the context Γ .
• Γ ` A = B, denoting that A and B are equal types.
• Γ ` M : A, denoting thatM is a term of type A.
• Γ ` M = N : A, denoting thatM and N are equal terms of type A.
• Γ ` P prop, denoting that P is a well-formed name of a small proposition.
• Γ ` P = Q , denoting that P and Q are equal names of small propositions.
• Γ ` φ Prop, denoting that φ is a well-formed proposition.
• Γ ` φ = ψ , denoting that φ and ψ are equal propositions.
• Γ ` φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ ψ , denoting that the propositions φ1, . . . , φn entail the proposition ψ .
The rules of deduction of LTTW are given in full in Appendix A.1. They consist of the introduction, elimination and
computation rules for the types of LTTW, the rules for classical predicate logic, and the following rule for performing induction
over N:
(IndN)
Γ , x : N ` φ Prop Γ ` N : N
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [0/x]φ Γ , x : N ` Φ, φ ⇒ [s x/x]φ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [N/x]φ
3.2. LTT0 and LTT∗0
We now construct two subsystems of LTTW, which we shall call LTT0 and LTT∗0 , that correspond to ACA0 and ACA
respectively. These subsystems are formed by changing:
• the class of types over which Nmay be eliminated (that is, the class of types A that may occur in EN([x]A, L, [x, y]M,N);
• the class of propositions thatmay be proved by induction (that is, the class of propositionsφ thatmay occur in an instance
of (IndN)).
In LTTW, wemay eliminateN over any type, and any propositionmay be proved by induction.We form our three subsystems
by weakening these two classes, as shown in Table 1.
This is achieved as follows.
1. We construct LTT0 by modifying LTTW as follows.• Whenever a term EN([x]A, L, [x, y]M,N) is formed, then Amust have the form T (K).
• Whenever an instance of the rule (IndN) is used, the proposition φ must have the form V (P).
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Table 1
Subsystems of LTTW .
Types over which Nmay be eliminated Propositions provable by induction
LTTW All All
LTT0 Small types Small propositions
LTT∗0 Small types Propositions involving quantification
over small types and Set (N)
• Whenever an instance of the rule (subst), (eta×) or (eta→) is used, the proposition φ must not contain a quantifier
∀x : A over any type A that contains the symbol U .
• We also add as an axiom that SM 6= 0 forM : N.
2. Let us say that a proposition φ is analytic iff, for every quantifier ∀x : A in φ, A either has the form T (M) or A ≡ Set (N).
We construct LTT∗0 from LTT0 by allowing (IndN) to be used whenever φ is an analytic proposition.
The formal definitions of both these systems are given in Appendices A.2 and A.3.
Remarks.
1. Peano’s fourth axiom, that SM 6=Nˆ 0 for any M : N, is provable in LTTW; see [3] for a proof. It is not provable in LTT0 or
LTT∗0 . This can be shown by a method similar to Smith [13], by constructing a model of LTT
∗
0 in which every small type is
interpreted by a set that has exactly one element.
2. We can now justify further our claim in Section 2.3 that Weyl’s definition of a(n, X) uses the primitive concepts of LTTW
that are not present in either LTT0 or LTT∗0 .
The definitions of d and a are straightforward to formalise in LTTW. GivenM : U , we have
dM ≡ λT : Set (Set (T (M))) .
{X : Set (T (M)) | ∃ˆx : M.(x∈ˆX ∧ X \ {x}∈ˆT )}
aM ≡ λn : N.λX : Set (T (M)) .
X ∈ EN([x]Set (Set (T (M))) ,U , [x, Y ]dM(Y ), n).
This is not a term in either of the subsystems of LTTW, as it involves applying EN to the type Set (Set (T (M))).
3. The universe U contains only the types that can be built up from N and ×. Its inclusion in LTT0 or LTT∗0 therefore does
not increase the proof-theoretic strength of the system (this will be proven in Section 5.3). This is a rare situation; in
general, the inclusion of a universe raises the strength of a type theory considerably (see for example [6]). We conjecture
that, if we closed U under→ or Set ( ) in LTT0 or LTT∗0 , the resulting system would not be conservative over ACA0 or ACA
respectively.
4. In Aczel and Gambino’s original formulation of LTTs [1,9], the logical component of an LTT could depend on the type-
theoretic component, but not vice versa. We have broken that restriction with the inclusion of typed sets: a canonical
object of Set (A) has the form {x : A | P} and thus depends on a small proposition P .
3.3. Embedding second order systems in logic-enriched type theories
There is a translation that can naturally be defined from the language of second order arithmetic L2 into LTT0. We map
the terms of L2 to terms of type N, first order quantifiers to quantifiers over N, and second order quantifiers to quantifiers
over Set (N).
Definition 3.1. We define
• for every term t of L2, a term 〈|t|〉 of LTTW;• for every arithmetic formula φ of L2, a small proposition |φ| of LTTW;• for every formula φ of L2, a proposition 〈|φ|〉 of LTTW.
〈|xi|〉 ≡ xi
〈|0|〉 ≡ 0〈∣∣t ′∣∣〉 ≡ s 〈|t|〉
〈|s+ t|〉 ≡ 〈|s|〉 plus 〈|t|〉
〈|s · t|〉 ≡ 〈|s|〉 times 〈|t|〉
|s = t| ≡ 〈|s|〉 =ˆNˆ 〈|t|〉|t ∈ Xi| ≡ 〈|t|〉 ∈ˆNˆXi
|¬φ| ≡ ¬ˆ |φ|
|φ ⊃ ψ | ≡ |φ| ⊃ˆ |ψ |
|∀xφ| ≡ ∀ˆx : Nˆ. |φ|
〈|s = t|〉 ≡ 〈|s|〉 =Nˆ 〈|t|〉〈|t ∈ Xi|〉 ≡ 〈|t|〉 ∈Nˆ Xi〈|¬φ|〉 ≡ ¬ 〈|φ|〉
〈|φ ⊃ ψ |〉 ≡ 〈|φ|〉 ⊃ 〈|ψ |〉
〈|∀xφ|〉 ≡ ∀x : N. 〈|φ|〉
〈|∀Xφ|〉 ≡ ∀X : Set (N) . 〈|φ|〉
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where
M plus N ≡ EN([x]T (Nˆ),M, [x, y] s y,N)
M times N ≡ EN([x]T (Nˆ), 0, [x, y]y plusM,N).
It is straightforward to show that this translation is sound, in the following sense:
Theorem 3.2. Let Γ be the context x1 : N, . . . , xm : N, X1 : Set (N) , . . . , Xn : Set (N). Let FV (t) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}, and
FV (φ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm, X1, . . . , Xn}.
1. Γ ` 〈|t|〉 : N and Γ ` 〈|φ|〉 Prop.
2. If φ is arithmetic, then Γ ` |φ| prop and Γ ` V (|φ|) = 〈|φ|〉.
3. If ACA0 ` φ, then Γ `⇒ 〈|φ|〉 in LTT0.
4. If ACA ` φ, then Γ `⇒ 〈|φ|〉 in LTT∗0 .
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 are proven straightforwardly by induction on t and φ.
For part 3, it is sufficient to prove the case where φ is an axiom of ACA0. The case of the Peano axioms is straightforward.
For the arithmetical comprehension axiom schema, let φ be an arithmetic formula in which X does not occur free. We
have
Γ ` ⇒ ∀x : N(V (|φ|)↔ 〈|φ|〉) (using part 1)
∴ Γ ` ⇒ ∀x : N(x ∈ {x : N | |φ|} ↔ 〈|φ|〉)
∴ Γ ` ⇒ ∃X : Set (N) .∀x : N(x ∈ X ↔ 〈|φ|〉)
as required.
The set induction axiom is shown to be provable using (IndN).
For part 4, it is sufficient to show that every instance of the full induction axiom schema is provable in LTT∗0 . This is easy
to do using (IndN), as 〈|φ|〉 is always an analytic proposition. 
Corollary 3.2.1. LTTW is strictly stronger than ACA0. In fact, LTTW can prove the consistency of ACA0.
Proof. As ACA0 is conservative over Peano Arithmetic [12], its proof-theoretic ordinal is 0. The proof-theoretic ordinal of
ACA is 0 [4,10]. Therefore, ACA can prove the consistency of ACA0; hence, so can LTT
∗
0; hence, so can LTTW. 
Our aim in this paper is to prove the converse to Theorem 3.2 parts 3 and 4: that, whenever Γ `⇒ 〈|φ|〉 in LTT0 or LTT∗0 ,
then φ is provable in the corresponding subsystem of second order arithmetic.
4. Conservativity of T2 over ACA0
We shall now define the system T2, which is a subsystem of LTT0. We can think of T2 as the second order fragment of
LTT0; that is, the part of LTT0 that has just the two types N and Set (N).
The translation 〈| |〉 given in the previous section is in fact a sound translation of ACA0 into T2. In this section, we shall
prove that this translation is conservative; that is, if 〈|φ|〉 is provable in T2, then φ is a theorem of ACA0.
The syntax of T2 is given by the following grammar
Type A ::= N | Set (N)
Term M ::= x | 0 | sM | R(M, [x, x]M,M) | {x : N | P}
Small Proposition P ::= M=ˆNM | ⊥ˆ | P⊃ˆP | ∀ˆx : Nˆ.P | M∈ˆNM
Proposition φ ::= M =N M | ⊥ | φ ⊃ φ | ∀x : A.φ | V (P).
The rules of deduction of T2 are:
1. the structural rules for LTTs as given in Appendix A.1.1;
2. the rules for predicate logic as given in Appendix A.1.7;
3. the rules for the propositional universe as given in Appendix A.1.8, with the rules for universal quantification replaced
with the rules in Fig. 1;
4. the rules for equality given in Appendix A.1.9, restricted to the type N;
5. the rules for sets given in Appendix A.1.5, restricted to the type N;
6. the rules for natural numbers given in Fig. 2.
Note. T2 does not contain the universe U . The symbol Nˆ therefore is not a term in T2, and cannot occur on its own, but only
as part of a small proposition ∀ˆx : Nˆ.P .
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Γ , x : N ` P Prop
Γ ` ∀ˆx : Nˆ.P Prop
Γ , x : N ` P = Q
Γ ` (∀ˆx : Nˆ.P) = (∀ˆx.Nˆ.Q )
Γ , x : N ` P Prop
Γ ` V (∀ˆx : Nˆ.P) = ∀x : N.V (P)
Fig. 1. Rules of deduction for small universal quantification in T2 .
Γ ` valid
Γ ` N type
Γ ` valid
Γ ` 0 : N
Γ ` M : N
Γ ` sM : N
Γ ` M = M ′ : N
Γ ` sM = sM ′ : N
Γ ` L : N
Γ , x : N, y : N ` M : N
Γ ` N : N
Γ ` R(L, [x, y]M,N) : N
Γ ` L = L′ : N
Γ , x : N, y : N ` M = M ′ : N
Γ ` N = N ′ : N
Γ ` R(L, [x, y]M,N) = R(L′, [x, y]M ′,N ′) : N
Γ ` L : N
Γ , x : N, y : N ` M : N
Γ ` R(L, [x, y]M, 0) = L : N
Γ ` L : N
Γ , x : N, y : N ` M : N
Γ ` N : N
Γ ` R(L, [x, y]M, sN)
= [N/x, R(L, [x, y]M,N)/y]M : N
(IndN)
Γ , x : N ` P Prop Γ ` N : N
Γ ` Φ ⇒ V ([0/x]P) Γ ` Φ, V (P)⇒ V ([s x/x]P)
Γ ` Φ ⇒ V ([N/x]P)
Fig. 2. Rules of deduction for natural numbers in T2 .
In LTT0, we could define functions by recursion into any small type; in T2, we can only define by recursion functions
from N to N. This is achieved by the constructor R. The term R(L, [x, y]M,N) is intended to denote the value f (N), where
f : N→ N is defined by recursion thus:
f (0) = L
f (n+ 1) = [n/x, f (n)/y]M.
The systemT2maybe considered a subsystemof LTT0 ifwe identify R(L, [x, y]M,N)with EN([x]Nˆ, L, [x, y]M,N);M =N N
withM =Nˆ N; andM=ˆNN withM=ˆNˆN .
The translation given in Section 3.3 is a sound translation from ACA0 into T2.
Theorem 4.1. Let Γ and φ be as in Theorem 3.2. If ACA0 ` φ, then Γ `⇒ 〈|φ|〉 in T2.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2(3). 
We now wish to show that the converse holds.
We shall do this by defining the following translationΦ from T2 to ACA0. Let
Γ ≡ x1 : N, . . . , xn : N, X1 : Set (N) , . . . , Xm : Set (N) .
We shall define:
1. whenever Γ ` M : N, an arithmetic formula t p= Mq such that
ACA0 ` ∃!x.x p= Mq.
The intention is thatM is interpreted as the unique number x for which x p= Mq is true.
2. whenever Γ ` M : Set (N), an arithmetic formula t p∈ Mq such that
ACA0 ` ∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ x p∈ Mq).
The intention is thatM is interpreted as the unique set X whose members are the numbers x such that x p∈ Mq is true.
3. for every small proposition P such that Γ ` P prop, an arithmetic formula pPq.
4. for every proposition φ such that Γ ` φ Prop, a formula pφq.
The definition is given in Fig. 3.
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Numbers
t p= xiq ≡ t = xi
t p= 0q ≡ t = 0
t p= sMq ≡ ∃x(x p= Mq ∧ t = Sx)
t p= R(L, [u, v]M,N)q ≡ ∃n.∃s ∈ Seq(n p= Nq ∧ (n, t) ∈ s
∧∀l((0, l) ∈ s ⊃ l p= Lq)
∧∀u∀z((Su, z) ∈ s ⊃ ∃v((u, v) ∈ s ∧ z p= Mq)))
Sets
t p∈ Xiq ≡ t ∈ Xi
t p∈ {x : N | P}q ≡ [t/x] pPq
Small Propositions
pM=ˆNNq ≡ ∃x(x p= Mq ∧ x p= Nq)
p⊥ˆq ≡ ⊥
pP⊃ˆQ q ≡ pPq ⊃ pQ q
p∀ˆx : N.Pq ≡ ∀x pPq
pM∈ˆNNq ≡ ∃x(x p= Mq ∧ x p∈ Nq)
Propositions
pM =N Nq ≡ ∃x(x p= Mq ∧ x p= Nq)
p⊥q ≡ ⊥
pφ ⊃ ψq ≡ pφq ⊃ pψq
p∀x : N.φq ≡ ∀x pφq
p∀X : Set (N) .φq ≡ ∀X pφq
pV (P)q ≡ pPq
Fig. 3. Interpretation of T2 in ACA0 .
Remark. To interpret a term of the form R(L, [u, v]M,N), we make use of a standard technique for defining functions by
recursion in ACA0. We are assumingwe have defined in ACA0 a pairing function (m, n) on the natural numbers, and a coding
of finite sequences of numbers as numbers, with Seq the set of all codes of sequences, and the formula n ∈ s expressing that
n is a member of the sequence coded by s. (For more details, see [12, II.3].)
Speaking informally, the formula t p= R(L, [u, v]M,N)q expresses that (N, t) is a member of a sequence s, and that the
members of this sequence smust be
(0, R(L, [u, v]M, 0)), (1, R(L, [u, v]M, 1)), . . . , (k, R(L, [u, v]M, k))
up to some k, in some order. It follows that t = R(L, [u, v]M,N).
The following theorem shows that the translation in Fig. 3 is sound.
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness). 1. If Γ ` M : N then ACA0 ` ∃!x.x p= Mq.
2. If Γ ` M = M ′ : N then ACA0 ` ∃x(x p= Mq ∧ x p= M ′q).
3. If Γ ` M : Set (N) then ACA0 ` ∃!X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ x p∈ Mq).
4. If Γ ` M = N : Set (N) then ACA0 ` ∀x(x p∈ Mq↔ x p∈ Nq).
5. If Γ ` P = Q then ACA0 ` pPq↔ pQ q.
6. If Γ ` φ = ψ then ACA0 ` pφq↔ pψq.
7. If Γ ` φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ ψ then ACA0 ` pφ1q ⊃ · · · ⊃ pφnq ⊃ pψq.
Proof. We need the following two results first.
1. For any termM such that x, y /∈ FV (M),
ACA0 ` x p= Mq ⊃ y p= Mq ⊃ x = y.
This is proven by induction onM .
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2. Given a term N such that x /∈ FV (N), the following are all theorems of ACA0:
x p= Nq ⊃ (y p= [N/x]Mq↔ y p= Mq) (2)
x p= Nq ⊃ (y p∈ [N/x]Mq↔ y p∈ Mq) (3)
∀x(x ∈ X ↔ x p∈ Nq) ⊃ (y p∈ [N/X]Mq↔ y p∈ Mq) (4)
x p= Nq ⊃ ( p[N/x]Pq↔ pPq) (5)
∀x(x ∈ X ↔ x p∈ Nq) ⊃ ( p[N/X]Pq↔ pPq) (6)
x p= Nq ⊃ ( p[N/x]φq↔ pφq) (7)
∀x(x ∈ X ↔ x p∈ Nq) ⊃ ( p[N/x]φq↔ pφq). (8)
These are proven by induction onM , P or φ. Formulas (3)–(6) must be proven simultaneously.
The seven parts of the theorem are now proven simultaneously by induction on derivations. We deal with one case here:
the rule
Γ ` L : N Γ , u : N, v : N ` M : N
Γ ` N : N
Γ ` R(L, [u, v]M, sN) = [N/u, R(L, [u, v]M,N)/v]M : N
We reason in ACA0. By the induction hypothesis, there exist l and n such that l p= Lq, n p= Nq. Further,
∀u∀v∃m.m p= Mq.
The following formula can be proven by induction on z:
∀z∃w∃s ∈ Seq((z, w) ∈ s
∧ ∀l((0, l) ∈ s ⊃ l p= Lq)
∧ ∀u∀z((Su, z) ∈ s ⊃ ∃v((u, v) ∈ s ∧ z p= Mq))).
Now, let n be the unique number such that n p= Nq. There exist m, p such that (n,m) and (Sn, p) are members of such a
sequence s. It follows that
p p= R(L, [u, v]M, s n)q, m p= R(L, [u, v]M, n)q, [n/u,m/v](p p= Mq).
Hence, by (2), we have
p p= R(L, [u, v]M, sN)q, p p= [N/u, R(L, [u, v]M,N)/v]Mq
as required. 
Conservativity shall follow from the following theorem,which states that themapping p q is a left-inverse to themapping
〈| |〉 from ACA0 to T2, up to logical equivalence.
Theorem 4.3.
1. For every term t of ACA0, we have ACA0 ` t p= 〈|t|〉q.
2. For every arithmetic proposition φ of ACA0, we have ACA0 ` φ ↔ p|φ|q.
3. For every proposition φ of ACA0, we have ACA0 ` φ ↔ p〈|φ|〉q.
Proof. The proof of each of these statements is a straightforward induction.We deal with one case here: the case t ≡ t1+t2.
We reason in ACA0. The induction hypothesis gives
t1 p= 〈|t1|〉q, t2 p= 〈|t2|〉q
and we must show t1 + t2 p= 〈|t1|〉 plus 〈|t2|〉q, i.e.
∃n.∃r ∈ Seq(n p= 〈|t2|〉q ∧ (n, t1 + t2) ∈ r
∧ ∀l((0, l) ∈ r ⊃ l p= 〈|t1|〉q)
∧ ∀x∀z((Sx, z) ∈ r ⊃ ∃y((x, y) ∈ r ∧ z = Sy))).
We prove the following by induction on b:
∀a, b.∃r ∈ Seq((b, a+ b) ∈ r
∧ ∀l((0, l) ∈ r ⊃ l = a)
∧ ∀x, z((Sx, z) ∈ r ⊃ ∃y((x, y) ∈ r ∧ z = Sy))).
The desired proposition follows by instantiating awith t1 and bwith t2. 
Corollary 4.3.1 (Conservativity of T2 Over ACA0). For any formula φ of ACA0, if Γ `⇒ 〈|φ|〉 in T2, then ACA0 ` φ.
Proof. By the Soundness Theorem, we have that ACA0 ` p〈|φ|〉q. By Theorem 4.3, we have ACA0 ` φ ↔ p〈|φ|〉q. Therefore,
ACA0 ` φ. 
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5. Conservativity of LTT0 over ACA0
In this section, we shall prove that LTT0 is conservative over T2. This shall complete the proof that LTT0 is conservative
over ACA0.
We shall do this by defining a number of subsystems of LTT0 as shown in the diagram:
T2 ↪→ Tω ↪→ TωU ↪→ LTT0.
For each of these inclusions A ↪→ B, we shall prove that A is a conservative subsystem of B; that is, for every judgement
J in the language of A, if J is derivable in B then J is derivable in A. This shall sometimes involve constructing yet more
subsystems in between A and B, and proving that all these inclusions are conservative.
Intuitively, each subsystem deals with a subset of the types of LTT0.
• T2 has only two types, N and Set (N).
• The types of Tω are all the types that can be built up from N using×,→ and Set ().
• The types of TωU are the types of Tω , together with the universe U . (The constructors×,→ and Set ()may not be applied
to U in TωU .)
The formal definitions of these systems shall be given in the sections to come.
5.1. Digression — informal explanation of proof technique
Before proceeding with the technical details of the proof, we shall explain the informal ideas behind the technique we
use to prove LTT0 conservative over T2. The system LTT0 is formed from T2 by adding products, function types, types of sets,
and the universe U . Intuitively, none of these should increase the power of the system.
We can see this most clearly in the case of products. Speaking generally, let S be any type system, and let T be formed
by adding product types to S. Then T should have no more expressive power than S, because we can envisage a translation
from T to S:
• wherever a variable z : A× B occurs, replace it with two variables x : A, y : B;
• wherever a term of type A× B occurs, replace it with two terms, one of type A and one of type B.
As long as the only way of introducing terms of type A× B is the constructor ( , ), we should always be able to find the two
S-terms of types A and B that correspond to any T -term of type A× B. (This would however not be possible if (say) we could
eliminate N over A× B in T .)
In brief:
• the terms of type A× B can be interpreted as pairs 〈M,N〉whereM : A and N : B.
Similarly,
• the terms of type A→ B can be interpreted as pairs 〈x,M〉where x : A ` M : B;
• the terms of type Set (A) can be interpreted as pairs 〈x, P〉where x : A ` P prop.
Our proof relies on making these intuitive ideas formal.
These ideas show us how we might be able to remove types A→ B that involve only one use of the arrow, but they do
not show us how to handle types of the form (A→ B)→ C . Let us take another example: let S be a typing system without
function types, and let T be formed from S by adding function types. Let us define the depth of a type A, d(A) by:
• the depth of each type in S is 0;
• d(A→ B) = max(d(A), d(B))+ 1.
Then we have seen how to interpret types of depth 1 in terms of types of depth 0. More generally, we can interpret types of
depth n+ 1 in terms of types of depth n.
This shows us how to complete the proof. We introduce an infinite sequence of subsystems of T :
S = A0 ↪→ A1 ↪→ A2 ↪→ · · · T
where, inAn, only types of depth ≤ nmay occur. We build an interpretation ofAn+1 out of the terms ofAn: every type of
An is interpreted as itself; the types A→ B of depth n+ 1 are interpreted as the set of pairs 〈x,M〉 where x : A ` M : B in
An.
Using these interpretations, we can prove eachAn+1 conservative overAn, and hence T conservative over S. With these
intuitive ideas to guide us, we return to the proof development.
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5.2. Tω is conservative over T2
We shall now define the system Tω to be T2 extended with pairs, functions and sets over all types, and prove that Tω is
conservative over T2.
Definition 5.1 (Tω). The LTT Tω is defined as follows.
The grammar of Tω is the grammar of T2 extended with
Type A ::= · · · | A× A | A→ A | Set (A)
Term M ::= · · · | (M,M)A×A | piA×A1 (M) | piA×A2 (M) |
λx : A.M : A | M(M)A→A | {x : A | P}
Small Proposition P ::= · · · | M∈ˆAM.
The rules of deduction of Tω are the rules of deduction of T2, together with the rules for pairs (Appendix A.1.3), function
types (Appendix A.1.4) and typed sets (Appendix A.1.5).
Note that the type-theory component Tω is non-dependent: a term can never occur in a type. As a consequence, we have
Lemma 5.2. If Γ ` A = B in Tω then A ≡ B.
Proof. Induction on derivations. 
To prove that Tω is conservative over T2, we shall define an infinite sequence of subsystems of Tω , and prove that each is
conservative over the previous subsystem, and that the smallest is conservative over T2.
T2 ↪→ A1 ↪→ A2 ↪→ · · · Tω.
We define the depth of a type of Tω as follows.
Definition 5.3. Define the depth d(A) < ω of a type A of Tω by
d(N) = 0
d(A× B) = max(d(A), d(B))+ 1
d(A→ B) = max(d(A), d(B))+ 1
d(Set (N)) = 0
d(Set (A)) = d(A)+ 1. (A 6≡ N)
Note that the types of T2 are exactly the types of depth 0.
For n ≥ 1, we shall defineAn to be the fragment of Tω that deals only with types of depth≤ n.
Definition 5.4 (An). Let n ≥ 0. By a type (term, small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) ofAn, we mean a type
(term, small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of Tω that does not contain, as a subexpression, any type of depth
> n.
We say a judgement J ofAn is derivable inAn iff there exists a derivation of J in Tω consisting solely of judgements of
An; that is, a derivation of J in which no type of depth> n occurs. We write Γ `n J iff the judgement Γ ` J is derivable
inAn.
Note that the types ofAn are exactly the types of depth≤ n. Note also thatA0 is just the system T2.
We shall prove thatAn+1 is conservative overAn. The proof shall involve defining an interpretation ofAn+1 in terms of
the expressions ofAn. For the rest of this section, fix n ≥ 0, and fix a context∆ ofAn such that∆ `n valid.
Definition 5.5 (Interpretation of Types). For the purposes of this definition, an ‘object’ is either a term of An, or a pair of
terms ofAn.
For every type A ofAn+1, we define the set of objects [[A]]∆, and an equivalence relation∼A∆ on this set, as follows.
If d(A) ≤ n, then
[[A]]∆ = {M | ∆ `n M : A}
M ∼A∆ N ⇔ ∆ `n M = N : A.
Otherwise,
[[A× B]]∆ = {〈M,N〉 | ∆ `n M : A,∆ `n N : B}
〈M,N〉 ∼A×B∆ 〈M ′,N ′〉 ⇔ ∆ `n M = M ′ : A ∧∆ `n N = N ′ : B
[[A→ B]]∆ = {〈x,M〉 | ∆, x : A `n M : B}
〈x,M〉 ∼A→B∆ 〈x,M ′〉 ⇔ ∆, x : A `n M = M ′ : B
[[Set (A)]]∆ = {〈x, P〉 | ∆, x : A `n P prop}
〈x, P〉 ∼Set(A)∆ 〈x, P ′〉 ⇔ ∆, x : A `n P = P ′.
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We identify the elements of [[A→ B]]∆ and [[Set (A)]]∆ up to α-conversion; that is, we identify 〈x,M〉 with 〈y, [y/x]M〉 if y
is not free inM .
We define the operationsΠ1,Π2 and @ on these objects as follows.
Π1(〈M,N〉) ≡ M
Π2(〈M,N〉) ≡ N
〈x,M〉@N ≡ [N/x]M
〈x, P〉@N ≡ [N/x]P.
Π1(X) andΠ2(X) are undefined if X is not a pair. X@Y is undefined if X does not have the form 〈x, Z〉, or if Y is not a term.
The intention is that we will interpret the terms of type A as members of the set [[A]]∆, with equal terms being interpreted
as∼A∆-equivalent members
Definition 5.6 (Valuation). Let Γ ≡ x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An be a context of An+1. A ∆-valuation of Γ is a function v on
{x1, . . . , xn} such that
v(xi) ∈ [[Ai]]∆ (i = 1, . . . , n).
Definition 5.7 (Interpretation of Terms). Given a termM ofAn+1 and a function vwhose domain includes FV (M), we define
the object (|M|)vA as follows.
(|x|)v = v(x)
(|0|)v ≡ 0
(|sM|)v ' s(|M|)v
(|R(L, [x, y]M,N)|)v ' R((|L|)v, [x, y](|M|)v[x:=x,y:=y], (|N|)v)
(|(M,N)A×B|)v '
{
((|M|)v, (|N|)v)A×B if d(A× B) ≤ n
〈(|M|)v, (|N|)v〉 if d(A× B) = n+ 1
(|(piA×B1 (M))|)v '
{
piA×B1 ((|M|)v) if d(A× B) ≤ n
Π1((|M|)v) if d(A× B) = n+ 1
(|(piA×B2 (M))|)v '
{
piA×B2 ((|M|)v) if d(A× B) ≤ n
Π2((|M|)v) if d(A× B) = n+ 1
(|λx : A.M : B|)v '
{
λx : A.(|M|)v[x:=x] : B if d(A→ B) ≤ n
〈x, (|M|)v[x:=x]〉 if d(A→ B) = n+ 1
(|M(N)A→B|)v '
{
(|M|)v((|N|)v)A→B if d(A→ B) ≤ n
(|M|)v@(|N|)v if d(A→ B) = n+ 1
(|{x : A | P}|)v '
{{x : A | (|P|)v[x:=x]} if d(Set (A)) ≤ n
〈x, (|P|)v[x:=x]〉 if d(Set (A)) = n+ 1.
Note that this is a partial definition; (|M|)vA will sometimes be undefined.
Definition 5.8 (Interpretation of Small Propositions). If P is a smallAn+1-proposition, we define the small proposition (|P|)v
ofAn.
(|M=ˆNN|)v ' (|M|)v=ˆN(|N|)v
(|⊥ˆ|)v ≡ ⊥ˆ
(|P⊃ˆQ |)v ' (|P|)v⊃ˆ(|Q |)v
(|∀ˆx : N.P|)v ' ∀ˆx : N.(|P|)v[x:=x]
(|M∈ˆAN|)v '
{
(|M|)v∈ˆA(|N|)v if d(A) ≤ n
(|N|)v@(|M|)v if d(A) = n+ 1.
Definition 5.9 (Depth of a Proposition). We define the depth of a proposition φ, d(φ), to be
d(φ) =
{
0 if φ is quantifier-free
max{d(A) | φ contains a quantifier ∀x : A} otherwise.
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Definition 5.10 (Interpretation of Propositions). If φ is an An+1-proposition of depth ≤ n, we define the An-proposition
(|φ|)v as follows
(|M =N N|)v ' (|M|)v =N (|N|)v
(|⊥|)v ≡ ⊥
(|φ ⊃ ψ |)v ' (|φ|)v ⊃ (|ψ |)v
(|∀x : A.φ|)v ' ∀x : A.(|φ|)v[x:=x]
(|V (P)|)v ' V ((|P|)v).
Wehave defined a sound interpretation of all the judgement forms ofAn+1 except one: the judgement formΓ ` Φ ⇒ φ.
To interpret these judgements, we shall define a notion of satisfaction. Intuitively, we define what it is for a proposition φ of
An+1 to be ‘true’ under a context∆, valuation v and sequence of propositionsΦ ofAn.
Definition 5.11 (Satisfaction). Let Φ ≡ φ1, . . . , φm be a sequence of propositions of An such that ∆ `n φ1 Prop, . . . ,
∆ `n φm Prop. Let v be a ∆-valuation of Γ . Suppose Γ ` φ Prop. We define what it means for (∆,Φ, v) to satisfy φ,
(∆,Φ, v) |= φ, as follows.
If d(φ) ≤ n, then ((∆,Φ, v) |= φ)⇔ (∆ `n Φ ⇒ (|φ|)v).
Otherwise,
• (∆,Φ, v) |= φ ⊃ ψ iff, for all∆′ ⊇ ∆ andΦ ′ ⊇ Φ , if (∆′,Φ ′, v) |= φ then (∆′,Φ ′, v) |= ψ .
• (∆,Φ, v) |= ∀x : A.φ iff, for all∆′ ⊇ ∆ and a ∈ [[A]]∆′ , we have
(∆′,Φ, v[x := a]) |= φ.
Definition 5.12 (Satisfaction and Truth). Let Γ ` J be a judgement of An+1, and let v be a ∆-valuation of Γ . We define
what it means for∆ and v to satisfy J, written (∆, v) |= J, as follows:
• (∆, v) |= M : A iff (|M|)v ∈ [[A]]∆.
• (∆, v) |= M = N : A iff (|M|)v ∼A∆ (|N|)v .• (∆, v) |= P prop iff∆ `n (|P|)v prop.
• (∆, v) |= P = Q iff∆ `n (|P|)v = (|Q |)v .
• If d(φ) ≤ n, then (∆, v) |= φ Prop iff∆ `n (|φ|)v Prop.
• (∆, v) |= φ = ψ iff for allΦ , (∆,Φ, v) |= φ ⇔ (∆,Φ, v) |= ψ .
• (∆, v) |= ψ1, . . . , ψn ⇒ χ iff, for allΦ , if (∆,Φ, v) |= ψi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n then (∆,Φ, v) |= χ .
• For all other judgement bodies J, we have (∆, v) |= J for all∆, v.
We say a judgement Γ ` J ofAn+1 is true iff, for every context∆ ofAn such that∆ `n valid and every∆-valuation v of Γ ,
(∆, v) |= J.
The following theorem shows that this interpretation is sound.
Theorem 5.13 (Soundness). Every derivable judgement ofAn+1 is true.
The proof is given in Appendix B.1.
Theorem 5.14 (Completeness).
1. Let Γ ` J be a judgement of An, and suppose J does not have the form Φ ⇒ ψ . If the judgement is true, and Γ `n valid,
then the judgement is derivable inAn.
2. Let Γ ` φ1, . . . , φm ⇒ ψ be a judgement of An. If the judgement is true, and we have Γ `n valid and Γ `n φi Prop for
i = 1, . . . ,m, then the judgement is derivable inAn.
Proof.
1. Let 1Γ be the identity function on domΓ . Then 1Γ is a Γ -valuation of Γ and, for every expression X of An such that
FV (X) ⊆ domΓ ,
(|X |)1Γ ≡ X .
So, suppose Γ ` M : A is a judgement ofAn, and is true. Then
(Γ , 1Γ ) |= M : A
and so Γ `n (|M|)1Γ : A. But (|M|)1Γ ≡ M , and so Γ `n M : A as required.
The proof for the other judgement forms is similar.
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2. Suppose Γ ` Φ ⇒ ψ is true, whereΦ ≡ φ1, . . . , φm. We have that
Γ ` Φ ⇒ φi (i = 1, . . . ,m)
and so (Γ ,Φ, 1Γ ) satisfies each φi. Therefore, (Γ ,Φ, 1Γ ) satisfies ψ , that is
Γ ` Φ ⇒ ψ
as required. 
Corollary 5.14.1. If J is a judgement ofAn derivable inAn+1, then J is derivable inAn.
Proof. This follows almost immediately from the Soundness Theorem and the Completeness Theorem. There are just two
facts that need to be verified:
1. If Γ is a context ofAn, and Γ `n+1 J, then Γ `n valid.
2. If Γ is a context of An; φ1, . . . , φm are propositions of An; and Γ `n+1 φ1, . . . , φm ⇒ ψ; then Γ `n valid and
Γ `n φi Prop.
These are proven fairly easily by induction on derivations, using the Soundness and Completeness Theorems. 
Corollary 5.14.2 (Conservativity of Tω over T2). If J is a judgement of T2, and J is derivable in Tω , then J is derivable in T2.
Proof. Suppose J is derivable in Tω . Let n be the largest depth of type or proposition that occurs in the derivation. Then J is
derivable inAn. Applying Corollary 5.14.1, we have that J is derivable inAn−1,An−2, . . . ,A0. But derivability inA0 is the
same as derivability in T2. 
5.3. TωU is conservative over Tω
The system TωU is the fragment of LTT0 that includes all the types of Tω , and the universe U , but does not include types
such as U × U , N → U , or Set (U). It is defined in a similar manner to the systems An of the previous section, but using a
new notion of depth.
Definition 5.15 (TωU). A type A of LTT0 is a type of TωU , iff either A ≡ U or the symbol U does not occur in A.
By a term (small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of TωU , we mean a term (small proposition, proposition,
context, judgement) of LTT0 in which every type that occurs as a subexpression is a type of TωU
We say a judgement J of TωU is derivable in TωU iff there exists a derivation of J in LTT0 consisting solely of judgements
of TωU; that is, a derivation of J in which every type that occurs is a type of TωU .
We write Γ `+ J iff the judgement Γ ` J is derivable in TωU , and Γ `− J iff the judgement Γ ` J is derivable in Tω .
Note. The types of TωU are not closed under×,→ or Set ( ). For example, the types U×U and U → U are not types of TωU .
In order to prove TωU conservative over Tω , we must find an interpretation of U and of the types T (M). We do this by
interpreting the objects of T (M) as binary treeswith leaves labelled by natural numbers. For example, the object ((1, 2), 3)
of type T ((Nˆ×ˆNˆ)×ˆNˆ)will be interpreted as the binary tree
•
• 3
1 2
We interpret U as the set of all shapes of binary tree. We begin by inventing a syntax for the set of all shapes of binary trees:
Definition 5.16 (Shape). The set of shapes is defined inductively by:
• • is a shape.
• If S and T are shapes, so is S ∧ T .
We writeS for the set of all shapes.
The example tree above has shape (• ∧ •) ∧ •.
We must thus associate each shape with a small type. This association is done formally by the following function:
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Definition 5.17. For every shape S ∈ S , define the type T (S) of Tω as follows:
T (•) ≡ N
T (S ∧ T ) ≡ T (S)× T (T ).
There are two other gaps between TωU and Tω to be bridged. In Tω , we can only eliminate N over N; in TωU , we can
eliminate over any small type. Likewise, in Tω , a small proposition may only involve quantification over N; in TωU , a small
proposition may involve quantification over any small type.
We bridge these gaps by using the fact that every binary tree can be coded as a natural number. Given a bijection
P : N2 → N, we can assign a code number to every binary tree. The binary tree above, for example, would be assigned
the code number P(P(1, 2), 3). We shall define, for every shape S, mutually inverse functions
codeS : T (S)→ N
decodeS : N→ T (S).
Using these functions, we can interpret recursion over small types by recursion over N, and quantification over small types
by quantification over N.
We turn now to the formal details. The first step is to construct in Tω the bijection P above, and the coding and decoding
functions.
Lemma 5.18 (Pairing Function). There exist Tω-terms
P : N× N→ N
Q1 : N→ N
Q2 : N→ N
such that the following are theorems of Tω:
∀x : N.∀y : N.Q1(P(x, y)) =N x
∀x : N.∀y : N.Q2(P(x, y)) =N y
∀x : N.x =N P(Q1(x),Q2(x))
}
. (9)
Proof. Consider the three primitive recursive functions
p(m, n) = 2m(2n+ 1)
q(n) = the greatestm such that 2m divides n
r(n) = 1/2(n/2q(n) − 1).
It is straightforward to define terms P, Q1 and Q2 in Tω that express p, q and r and prove the three formulas (9). 
Fix three such terms P, Q1 and Q2 for the sequel.
We shall also need a notion of equality on every small type in Tω , not just N. This is defined as follows.
Definition 5.19. Given Tω-termsM and N and a Tω-type A, define the Tω-propositionM =A N as follows.
M =N N ≡ M =N N
M =A×B N ≡ pi1(M) =A pi1(N) ∧ pi2(M) =B pi2(N)
M =A→B N ≡ ∀x : A.M(x) =B N(x)
M =Set(A) N ≡ ∀x : A.(x ∈A M ↔ x ∈A N).
Definition 5.20 (Coding Functions). For each shape S ∈ S , define the Tω-terms
codeS : T (S)→ N
decodeS : N→ T (S)
as follows.
code• ≡ λx : N.x
decode• ≡ λx : N.x
codeS∧T ≡ λp : T (S)× T (T ).P(codeS(pi1(p)), codeT (pi2(p)))
decodeS∧T ≡ λn : N.(decodeS(Q1(n)), decodeT (Q2(n))).
Lemma 5.21. For every shape S, the following are theorems of Tω:
∀p : T (S).decodeS(codeS(p)) =T (S) p
∀n : N.codeS(decodeS(n)) =N n.
Proof. The proof is by induction on S, using the properties of P, Q1 and Q2 from Lemma 5.18. 
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We can now proceed to define our interpretation of TωU in terms of Tω . The definition is more complex than the
interpretation in the previous section, because the type-theoretic component of TωU is dependent, so we must define our
interpretations of terms and types simultaneously.
Definition 5.22. Let∆ be a context of Tω , and v a function. We define the following simultaneously.
• Given a TωU-termM and a function v, define the object (|M|)v as follows.
(|x|)v ' v(x)
(|0|)v ≡ 0
(|sM|)v ' s(|M|)v
(|(M,N)A×B|)v ' ((|M|)v, (|N|)v)(|A|)v×(|B|)v
(|piA×B1 (M)|)v ' pi (|A|)
v×(|B|)v
1 ((|M|)v)
(|piA×B2 (M)|)v ' pi (|A|)
v×(|B|)v
2 ((|M|)v)
(|λx : A.M : B|)v ' λx : (|A|)v.(|M|)v[x:=x] : (|B|)v
(|M(N)A→B|)v ' (|M|)v((|N|)v)(|A|)v→(|B|)v
(|Nˆ|)v = •
(|M×ˆN|)v ' (|M|)v ∧ (|N|)v
(|{x : A | P}|)v ' {x : (|A|)v | (|P|)v[x:=x]}
(|EN([x]T (K), L, [x, y]M,N)|)v ' decodeS((|N|)v)(R(codeS(0)((|L|)v),
[x, y]codeS(s x)((|M|)v′), (|N|)v))
where S(N) ≡ (|K |)v[x:=N] and v′ = v[x := x, y := decodeS(x)(y)].• Given a type A 6≡ U of TωU , define a type (|A|)v of Tω .
(|N|)v ≡ N
(|A× B|)v ' (|A|)v × (|B|)v
(|A→ B|)v ' (|A|)v → (|B|)v
(|T (M)|)v ' T ((|M|)v)
(|Set (A)|)v ' Set ((|A|)v) .
• Given a TωU-type A, define a set [[A]]v∆ and an equivalence relation∼A∆v on [[A]]v∆ as follows.
If A 6≡ U , then
[[A]]v = {M | ∆ `+ M : (|A|)v}
M ∼A∆v N ⇔ ∆ `+⇒ M =(|A|)v N.
Otherwise,
[[U]]v = S
S ∼U∆v T ⇔ S = T .
• Let Γ ≡ x1 : A1, . . . , xm : Am be a context of TωU . We say that v is a∆-valuation of Γ iff v(xi) ∈ [[Ai]]v∆ for i = 1, . . . , n.• Given a small proposition P of TωU , define a small proposition (|P|)v of Tω as follows.
(|M1=ˆNM2|)v ' code(|N|)v ((|M1|)v)=ˆNcode(|N|)v ((|M2|)v)
(|⊥ˆ|)v ≡ ⊥ˆ
(|P⊃ˆQ |)v ≡ (|P|)v⊃ˆ(|Q |)v
(|∀ˆx : M.P|)v ' ∀ˆx : N.(|P|)v[x:=decode(|M|)v (x)]
(|M∈ˆAN|)v ' (|M|)v∈ˆ(|A|)v (|N|)v.
• Given a proposition φ of TωU that does not include a quantifier over U , define a proposition (|φ|)v of Tω as follows.
(|M1 =N M2|)v ' (|M1|)v =T ((|N|)v) (|M2|)v
(|⊥|)v ≡ ⊥
(|φ ⊃ ψ |)v ' (|φ|)v ⊃ (|ψ |)v
(|∀x : A.φ|)v ' ∀x : (|A|)v.(|φ|)v[x:=x]
(|V (P)|)v ' V ((|P|)v).
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Recall that we write∆ `− J iff∆ ` J is derivable in Tω .
Definition 5.23 (Satisfaction). Let Φ ≡ φ1, . . . , φm be a sequence of propositions of Tω such that ∆ `− φi Prop. Let v be a
∆-valuation of Γ . Suppose Γ ` φ Prop. We define what it means for (∆,Φ, v) to satisfy φ, (∆,Φ, v) |= φ, as follows.
If φ does not involve quantification over U , then
((∆,Φ, v) |= φ)⇔ (∆ `− Φ ⇒ (|φ|)v).
Otherwise,
• (∆,Φ, v) |= φ ⊃ ψ iff, for all∆′ ⊇ ∆ andΦ ′ ⊇ Φ , if (∆′,Φ ′, v) |= φ then (∆′,Φ ′, v) |= ψ .
• (∆,Φ, v) |= ∀x : A.φ iff, for all∆′ ⊇ ∆ and a ∈ [[A]]v∆, we have (∆′,Φ, v[x := a]) |= φ.
Definition 5.24 (Satisfaction and Truth). Let Γ ` J be a judgement of TωU . Let∆ `− valid, and let v be a∆-valuation of Γ .
We define what it means for∆ and v to satisfy J, (∆, v) |= J, as follows.
• If A 6≡ U , then (∆, v) |= A type iff (|A|)v is defined.
• If A 6≡ U 6≡ B, then (∆, v) |= A = B iff (|A|)v ≡ (|B|)v .
• (∆, v) |= M : A iff (|M|)v ∈ [[A]]v∆.• (∆, v) |= M = N : A iff (|M|)v ∼A∆v (|N|)v .• (∆, v) |= P prop iff∆ `− (|P|)v prop.
• (∆, v) |= P = Q iff∆ `−⇒ V ((|P|)v)↔ V ((|Q |)v).
• If φ does not include a quantifier over U , then (∆, v) |= φ Prop iff∆ `− (|φ|) Prop.
• (∆, v) |= φ = ψ iff, for allΦ , we have (∆,Φ, v) |= φ iff (∆,Φ, v) |= ψ .
• (∆, v) |= φ1, . . . , φm ⇒ ψ iff, for allΦ , if (∆,Φ, v) |= φi for i = 1, . . . ,m then (∆,Φ, v) |= ψ .• For all other judgement forms, we have (∆, v) |= J for all∆, v.
We say a judgement Γ ` J of TωU is true iff, for all∆ such that∆ `− valid and all∆-valuations v of Γ , (∆, v) |= J.
Remark. This interpretation uses the propositional equality defined in Definition 5.19, whereas our interpretation in the
previous section used judgemental equality. This is because the properties of our coding and decoding functions can be
shown to hold up to propositional equality (as in Lemma 5.21), but not up to judgemental equality.
We now prove that the interpretation is sound.
Theorem 5.25 (Soundness). Every derivable judgement in TωU is true.
The proof is given in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 5.26 (Completeness). If Γ ` J is a judgement of Tω that is true, and Γ `− valid, then Γ ` J is derivable in Tω .
Proof. Exactly as in Theorem 5.14. 
Corollary 5.26.1. If J is a judgement of Tω derivable in TωU, then J is derivable in Tω .
Proof. Similar to Corollary 5.14.1. 
5.4. LTT0 is conservative over TωU
The next step in our proof is to apply the same method to show that LTT0 is conservative over TωU . The proof is very
similar to Section 5.2, but the details are more complicated, because we are now dealing with LTTs whose type-theoretic
components use dependent types.
Once again, we introduce an infinite sequence of subsystems between TωU and LTT0:
TωU = B0 ↪→ B1 ↪→ B2 ↪→ · · · LTT0.
We do this using a new definition of the depth of a type:
Definition 5.27 (Depth). Define the depth D(A) of a type A of LTT0 by
D(N) = 0
D(A× B) =
{
0 if D(A) = D(B) = 0
max(D(A),D(B))+ 1 otherwise
D(A→ B) =
{
0 if D(A) = D(B) = 0
max(D(A),D(B))+ 1 otherwise
D(Set (A)) =
{
0 if D(A) = 0
D(A)+ 1 otherwise
D(U) = 1
D(T (M)) = 0.
We define the depth of a proposition φ, D(φ), to be the largest depth of a type A such that the quantifier ∀x : A occurs in φ,
or D(φ) = 0 if φ is quantifier-free.
Note that the types of TωU are exactly the types A such that D(A) ≤ 1.
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The subsystemsBn are defined as follows.
Definition 5.28 (Bn). Let n ≥ 0. By a type (term, small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of Bn , we mean a
type (term, small proposition, proposition, context, judgement) of LTT0 that does not contain, as a subexpression, any type
A such that D(A) > n.
We say a judgement J ofBn is derivable inBn iff there exists a derivation of J in LTT0 consisting solely of judgements of
Bn; that is, a derivation ofJ in which no type A occurs such thatD(A) > n. In this section, wewriteΓ `n J iff the judgement
Γ ` J is derivable inBn.
We define an interpretation ofBn+1 in terms ofBn:
Definition 5.29. Fix n ≥ 1. Let∆ be a context ofBn, and v a function. We define the following simultaneously.
• Given a termM ofBn+1, define the object (|B|)v .
(|x|)v ' v(x)
(|0|)v ≡ 0
(|sM|)v ' s(|M|)v
(|EN([x]T (K), L, [x, y]M,N)|)v ' EN([x]T ((|K |)v[x:=x]), (|L|)v,
[x, y](|M|)v[x:=x,y:=y], (|N|)v)
(|(M,N)A×B|)v '
{
((|M|)v, (|N|)v)(|A|)v×(|B|)v if D(A× B) ≤ n
〈(|M|)v, (|N|)v〉 if D(A× B) = n+ 1
(|piA×B1 (M)|)v '
{
pi
(|A|)v×(|B|)v
1 ((|M|)v) if D(A× B) ≤ n
Π1((|M|)v) if D(A× B) = n+ 1
(|piA×B2 (M)|)v '
{
pi
(|A|)v×(|B|)v
2 ((|M|)v) if D(A× B) ≤ n
Π2((|M|)v) if D(A× B) = n+ 1
(|λx : A.M : B|)v '

λx : (|A|)v.(|M|)v[x:=x] : (|B|)v
if D(A→ B) ≤ n
〈x, (|M|)v[x:=x]〉 if D(A→ B) = n+ 1
(|M(N)A→B|)v '
{
(|M|)v((|N|)v)(|A|)v→(|B|)v if D(A→ B) ≤ n
(|M|)v@(|N|)v if D(A→ B) = n+ 1
(|Nˆ|)v ≡ Nˆ
(|M×ˆN|)v ' (|M|)v×ˆ(|N|)v
(|{x : A | P}|)v '
{{x : (|A|)v | (|P|)v[x:=x]} if D(Set (A)) ≤ n
〈x, (|P|)v[x:=x]〉 if D(Set (A)) = n+ 1.
• Given a type A ofBn+1 such that D(A) ≤ n, define the type (|A|)v ofBn.
(|N|)v ≡ N
(|A× B|)v ' (|A|)v × (|B|)v
(|A→ B|)v ' (|A|)v → (|B|)v
(|U|)v ≡ U
(|T (M)|)v ' T ((|M|)v)
(|Set (A)|)v ' Set ((|A|)v) .
• Given a small proposition P ofBn+1, define the small proposition (|P|)v as follows.
(|M1=ˆNM2|)v ' (|M1|)v=ˆ(|N|)v (|M2|)v
(|⊥ˆ|)v ≡ ⊥ˆ
(|P⊃ˆQ |)v ' (|P|)v⊃ˆ(|Q |)v
(|∀ˆx : M.P|)v ' ∀ˆx : (|M|)v.(|P|)v[x:=x]
(|M∈ˆAN|)v ' (|M|)v∈ˆ(|A|)v (|N|)v.
• Given a type A ofBn+1, define a set [[A]]v∆ and an equivalence relation∼A∆v on this set.
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If D(A) ≤ n, then
[[A]]v∆ = {M | ∆ `n M : (|A|)v}
M ∼A∆v N ⇔ ∆ `n M = N : (|A|)v.
Otherwise,
[[A× B]]v∆ = {〈M,N〉 | ∆ `n M : (|A|)v,∆ `n N : (|B|)v}
〈M,N〉 ∼A×B∆v 〈M ′,N ′〉 ⇔ ∆ `n M = M ′ : (|A|)v
∧∆ `n N = N ′ : (|B|)v
[[A→ B]]v∆ = {〈x,M〉 | ∆, x : (|A|)v ` M : (|B|)v}
〈x,M〉 ∼A→B∆v 〈x,M ′〉 ⇔ ∆, x : (|A|)v ` M = M ′ : (|B|)v
[[Set (A)]]v∆ = {〈x, P〉 | ∆, x : (|A|)v ` P prop}
〈x, P〉 ∼Set(A)∆v 〈x, P ′〉 ⇔ ∆, x : (|A|)v ` P = P ′.
• Given a context Γ ≡ x1 : A1, . . . , xm : Am ofBn+1, we say that v is a∆-valuation of Γ iff v(xi) ∈ [[Ai]]v∆ for each i.• Given a proposition φ ofBn+1 such that D(φ) ≤ n, define the proposition (|φ|)v as follows.
(|M1 =N M2|)v ' (|M1|)v =(|N|)v (|M2|)v
(|⊥|)v ≡ ⊥
(|φ ⊃ ψ |)v ' (|φ|)v ⊃ (|ψ |)v
(|∀x : A.φ|)v ' ∀x : (|A|)v.(|φ|)v[x:=x]
(|V (P)|)v ' V ((|P|)v).
We define what the notion of satisfaction (∆,Φ, v) |= ψ similarly to Definition 5.11:
Definition 5.30 (Satisfaction). Let Φ ≡ φ1, . . . , φm be a sequence of propositions of An such that ∆ `n φ1 Prop, . . . ,
∆ `n φm Prop. Let v be a ∆-valuation of Γ . Suppose Γ `n+1 φ Prop. We define what it means for (∆,Φ, v) to satisfy
φ, (∆,Φ, v) |= φ, as follows.
If D(φ) ≤ n, then ((∆,Φ, v) |= φ)⇔ (∆ `n Φ ⇒ (|φ|)v).
Otherwise,
• (∆,Φ, v) |= φ ⊃ ψ iff, for all∆′ ⊇ ∆ andΦ ′ ⊇ Φ , if (∆′,Φ ′, v) |= φ then (∆′,Φ ′, v) |= ψ .
• (∆,Φ, v) |= ∀x : A.φ iff, for all∆′ ⊇ ∆ and a ∈ [[A]]v
∆′ , we have (∆
′,Φ, v[x := a]) |= φ.
Definition 5.31 (Satisfaction and Truth). Let Γ ` J be a judgement of Bn+1. Let ∆ `n valid and v be a ∆-valuation of Γ .
We define what it means for∆ and v to satisfy J, (∆, v) |= J, as follows.
• If D(A) ≤ n, then (∆, v) |= A type iff [[A]]v∆ is defined and∆ `n (|A|)v type.
If D(A) = n+ 1, then (∆, v) |= A type iff [[A]]v∆ is defined.• If D(A),D(B) ≤ n, then (∆, v) |= A = B iff [[A]]v∆ = [[B]]v∆ and
(∼A∆v) = (∼B∆v) and∆ `n (|A|)v = (|B|)v .
If D(A) = D(B) = n+ 1, then (∆, v) |= A = B iff [[A]]v∆ = [[B]]v∆ and (∼A∆v) = (∼B∆v).• (∆, v) |= M : A iff (|M|)v ∈ [[A]]v∆.• (∆, v) |= M = N : A iff (|M|)v ∼A∆v (|N|)v• (∆, v) |= P prop iff∆ `n (|P|)v prop.• (∆, v) |= P = Q iff∆ `n (|P|)v = (|Q |)v• If D(φ) ≤ n, then (∆, v) |= φ Prop iff∆ `n (|φ|)v Prop.• (∆, v) |= φ = ψ iff, for allΦ , we have (∆,Φ, v) |= φ iff (∆,Φ, v) |= ψ .
• (∆, v) |= ψ1, . . . , ψm ⇒ χ iff, for allΦ , if (∆,Φ, v) satisfies ψi for all i, then (∆,Φ, v) satisfies χ .• For any other J, we have (∆, v) |= J for all∆, v.
We say Γ ` J is true iff, whenever∆ `n valid and v is a∆-valuation of Γ , then (∆, v) |= J.
Theorem 5.32 (Soundness). Every derivable judgement inBn+1 is true.
Proof. Similar to Theorems 5.13 and 5.25. 
Theorem 5.33.
1. Let Γ ` J be a judgement of Bn, and suppose J does not have the form Φ ⇒ ψ . If the judgement is true, and Γ `n valid,
then the judgement is derivable inBn.
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2. Let Γ ` φ1, . . . , φm ⇒ ψ be a judgement of Bn. If the judgement is true, and we have Γ `n valid and Γ `n φi Prop for
i = 1, . . . ,m, then the judgement is derivable inBn.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 5.14. 
Corollary 5.33.1. If J is a judgement ofBn derivable inBn+1, then J is derivable inBn.
Corollary 5.33.2. If J is a judgement of TωU derivable in LTT0, then J is derivable in TωU.
With this final step, we have now completed the proof of the conservativity of LTT0 over ACA0:
Corollary 5.33.3. Let φ be a formula of second order arithmetic with free variables x1, . . . , xm, X1, . . . , Xn. If
x1 : N, . . . , xm : N, X1 : Set (N) , . . . , Xn : Set (N) `⇒ 〈|φ|〉
in LTT0 then ACA0 ` φ.
Proof. Let J be the judgement x1 : N, . . . , xm : N, X1 : Set (N) , . . . , Xn : Set (N) `⇒ 〈|φ|〉.
Suppose J is derivable in LTT0. Then
J is derivable in TωU (Corollary 5.33.2)
∴ J is derivable in Tω (Corollary 5.26.1)
∴ J is derivable in T2 (Corollary 5.14.2)
∴ ACA0 ` φ (Corollary 4.3.1). 
6. Other conservativity results
6.1. Conservativity of LTT∗0 over ACA
Our proof method can be adapted quite straightforwardly to prove the conservativity of LTT∗0 over ACA. We shall present
these proofs briefly, giving only the details that need to be changed.
We define subsystems of LTT∗0:
T∗2 ↪→ T∗ω ↪→ TωU∗ ↪→ LTT∗0.
T∗2 is formed from T2 by allowing the rule (IndN) to be applied with any analytic proposition φ. In the same manner, T∗ω is
formed from Tω , TωU∗ is formed from TωU , and LTT∗0 is formed from LTT0.
The proof of the conservativity of LTT∗0 over T∗2 follows exactly the same pattern as in Section 5.
Theorem 6.1. Theorem 4.2 holds for T∗2 and ACA.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
Similarly, Corollary 5.14.2 holds for T∗ω and T∗2 , Corollary 5.26.1 holds for TωU∗ and T∗ω , and Corollary 5.33.2 holds for LTT
∗
0
and TωU∗. This completes the proof that LTT∗0 is conservative over ACA.
6.2. Conservativity of ACA0 over PA
As a side-benefit of this work, we can easily produce as a corollary another proof that ACA0 is conservative over Peano
Arithmetic (PA). We can define a system T1 with just one type,N, in its type-theoretic component. We can apply ourmethod
to show that T2 is conservative over T1, and that T1 is conservative over PA; we omit the details.
Combining all these proofs, we can produce the following elementary proof that ACA0 is conservative over PA, which
proceeds by interpreting the formulas of ACA0 as statements about PA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this proof has
not appeared in print before.
Theorem 6.2. ACA0 is conservative over PA.
Proof. Define a PA-formula to be a formula in which no set variables (bound or free) occur.
Let V be a set of variables of L2. A valuation of V is a function v on V such that:
• for every number variable x ∈ V , v(x) is a term of PA;
• for every set variable X ∈ V , v(X) is an expression of the form {y | φ}where φ is a PA-formula.
For t a term, let v(t) be the result of substituting v(x) for each variable x in t .
For φ a formula of L2, let v(φ) be the PA-formula that results from making the following replacements throughout φ.
• Replace each atomic formula s = t with v(s) = v(t).
• For each atomic formula t ∈ X , let v(X) = {y | ψ}. Replace t ∈ X with [v(t)/y]ψ .
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Define what it is for a valuation v and PA-formula ψ to satisfy an L2-formula φ, (v, ψ) |= φ, as follows.
• If φ is arithmetic, (v, ψ) |= φ iff ψ ⊃ v(φ) is a theorem of PA. Otherwise:
• (v, ψ) |= φ ⊃ χ iff, for any PA-formula ψ ′, if (v, ψ ∧ ψ ′) |= φ then (v, ψ ∧ ψ ′) |= χ .
• (v, ψ) |= ∀xφ iff, for every term t , (v[x := t], ψ) |= φ.
• (v, ψ) |= ∀Xφ iff, for every PA-formula χ , (v[X := {y | χ}], ψ) |= φ.
Let us say that a formula φ of L2 is true iff (v, x = x) |= φ for every valuation v.
We prove the following two claims:
1. Every theorem of ACA0 is true.
2. Every PA-formula that is true is a theorem of PA.
The first claim is proven by induction on derivations in ACA0. As an example, consider the axiom
∀X(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ∀Xψ)
where X /∈ FV (φ). Fix v and χ , and suppose
(v, χ) |= ∀X(φ ⊃ ψ).
Wemust show that (v, χ) |= φ ⊃ ∀Xψ .
Let χ ′ be any PA-formula, and suppose (v, χ ∧ χ ′) |= φ. Let τ be any PA-formula; we must show that (v[X := {y |
τ }], χ ∧ χ ′) |= φ. Since X /∈ FV (φ), we have that
(v[X := {y | τ }], χ ∧ χ ′) |= φ.
We also have (v[X := {y | τ }], χ ∧ χ ′) |= φ ⊃ ψ , and so (v[X := {y | τ }], χ ∧ χ ′) |= ψ as required.
The second claim is proven using the valuation that is the identity on FV (φ).
It follows that, if a formula of PA is a theorem of ACA0, then it is a theorem of PA. 
Remarks.
1. The same method could be used to show that Gödel–Bernays set theory is conservative over ZF set theory.
2. Another proof-theoretic method of proving this results is given in [11]. That proof relies on some quite strong results
about classical theories; our proof is more elementary. However, Shoenfield’s proof is constructive (giving an algorithm
that would produce a proof of⊥ in PA from a proof of⊥ in ACA0) and can be formalised in PRA; ours has neither of these
properties.
6.3. ACA+0
An argument has been made that the system ACA+0 corresponds to Weyl’s foundation [5, p. 135], claiming that its axiom
schema of ω-iterated arithmetical comprehension ‘occurs in the formal systems defined by Weyl and Zahn’, presumably a
reference to Weyl’s Principle of Iteration [16, p. 38].
The axioms of ACA+0 are the axioms of ACA0 together with the following axiom schema of ω-iterated arithmetical
comprehension. Assume we have defined a pairing function (x, y) in ACA0. We put
(X)j = {n : (n, j) ∈ X}, (X)j = {(m, i) : (m, i) ∈ X ∧ i < j}.
Then, for every arithmetical formula φ[n, Y ] in which X does not occur free, the following is an axiom:
∃X∀j∀n(n ∈ (X)j ↔ φ[n, (X)j]).
The translation we gave in Section 3.3 is a sound translation from ACA+0 into LTTW. It is difficult to construct a subsystem
of LTTW that is conservative over ACA+0 , however. A natural suggestion would be to extend LTT0 by allowing EN to take
either a small type, or the type Set (N); let us call the system produced LTT+0 . Then LTT
+
0 is indeed conservative over T
+
2 , the
extension of T2 with a new constructor
Γ ` L : Set (N) Γ , x : N, Y : Set (N) ` M : Set (N)
Γ ` N : N
Γ ` R+(L, [x, Y ]M,N) : Set (N)
and appropriate equality rules.
However, it seems unlikely that T+2 is conservative over ACA
+
0 . In particular, there seems to be no way to interpret terms
that involve two or more applications of R+. In LTT+0 , we may iterate any definable function Set (N) → Set (N). In ACA+0 ,
we may only iterate those functions that are defined by an arithmetic proposition; and not every such function definable in
ACA+0 is defined by an arithmetic proposition.
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7. Conclusion
We have constructed two subsystems of LTTW, and proved that these are conservative over ACA0 and ACA respectively.
We have thus shown how, using LTTs, we can take a system like ACA0 or ACA and add to it the ability to speak of pairs,
functions of all orders, sets of all orders, and a universe of types, without increasing the proof-theoretic strength of the
system.
We have also begun the proof-theoretic analysis of LTTW. We now know that LTTW is strictly stronger than LTT0, and
hence ACA0. The subsystem LTT∗0 is quite a small fragment of LTTW, and so we conjecture that LTTW is strictly stronger than
LTT∗0 , and hence strictly stronger than ACA. Once this conjecture is proven, we will have quite strong evidence for our claim
that Weyl’s foundation exceeds both ACA0 and ACA.
The method of proof we have given is quite a general one, and should be applicable in many other situations. It does
not rely on any reduction properties of the type system, and so could be applied to type systems that are not strongly
normalising, or do not satisfy Church–Rosser (or are not known to be strongly normalising or to satisfy Church–Rosser). It
provides a uniform method for proving types redundant; we were able to remove products, function types, types of sets,
and the universe from LTT0.
Furthermore, the method allowed us to separate these tasks. We were able to remove U separately from the other types,
and to use a different interpretation to do so. In Sections 5.2 and 5.4, for example, we interpreted judgemental equality by
judgemental equality; in Section 5.3, we interpreted judgemental equality by propositional equality. Our method is thus
quite powerful; we did not have to find a single interpretation that would perform all these tasks.
A proof of our conjecture that LTTW is stronger than LTT∗0 has very recently been discovered, by the first author and Anton
Setzer. The proof-theoretic strength of LTTW is in fact φ0(0). A paper presenting the proof of this result is in preparation.
For futurework,we should investigatemore generally howadding features to an LTT changes its proof-theoretic strength.
This will be a more difficult task, as we will need to investigate what effect induction and recursion have when they are
no longer confined to the small types and propositions. We are particularly interested in the differences between LTTs
and systems of predicate logic; for example, in how the strength of an LTT changes when we modify the type-theoretic
component but not the logical component.
Finally, we note that there are striking superficial similarities between our work and Streicher [14], who also gave
interpretations to type theories. Like our interpretations, his were first defined as partial functions on the syntax, then
proven to be total on the typable terms by induction on derivations. He also made use of a ‘depth’ function on types. Our
work is not a direct application of his, but it remains to be seen whether there are formal connections that can be exploited.
Appendix A. Formal definition of systems
We present here the definition of LTTW and the two principal subsystems used in this paper.
A.1. LTTW
The syntax of LTTW is given by the following grammar:
Type A ::= N | A× A | A→ A | U | T (M) | Set (A)
Term M ::= x | 0 | sM | EN([x]A,M, [x, x]M,M) |
(M,M)A×A | piA×A1 (M) | piA×A2 (M) |
λx : A.M : A | M(M)A→A | Nˆ | M×ˆM |
{x : A | P}
small Proposition P ::= M=ˆMM | ⊥ˆ | P⊃ˆP | ∀ˆx : M.P | M∈ˆAM
Formula φ ::= M =M M | ⊥ | φ ⊃ φ | ∀x : A.φ | V (P).
We write ¬φ for φ ⊃ ⊥, andM ∈A N for V (M∈ˆAN).
The rules of deduction of LTTW are as follows:
A.1.1. Structural rules
` valid
Γ ` A type
Γ , x : A ` valid
Γ ` valid
(x : A ∈ Γ )
Γ ` x : A
Γ ` M : A
Γ ` M = M : A
Γ ` M = N : A
Γ ` N = M : A
Γ ` M = N : A Γ ` N = P : A
Γ ` M = P : A
Γ ` A type
Γ ` A = A
Γ ` A = B
Γ ` B = A
Γ ` A = B Γ ` B = C
Γ ` A = C
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Γ ` M : A Γ ` A = B
Γ ` M : B
Γ ` M = N : A Γ ` A = B
Γ ` M = N : B
Γ ` P prop
Γ ` P = P
Γ ` P = Q
Γ ` Q = P
Γ ` P = Q Γ ` Q = R
Γ ` P = R
Γ ` φ Prop
Γ ` φ = φ
Γ ` φ = ψ
Γ ` ψ = φ
Γ ` φ = ψ Γ ` ψ = χ
Γ ` φ = χ
Γ ` φ1 Prop · · · Γ ` φn Prop
Γ ` φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φi
Γ ` Φ ⇒ φ Γ ` φ = ψ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ ψ
A.1.2. Natural numbers
Γ ` valid
Γ ` N type
Γ ` valid
Γ ` 0 : N
Γ ` M : N
Γ ` sM : N
Γ ` M = M ′ : N
Γ ` sM = sM ′ : N
(EN)
Γ , x : N ` C type Γ ` L : [0/x]C
Γ , x : N, y : C ` M : [s x/x]C Γ ` N : N
Γ ` EN([x]C, L, [x, y]M,N) : [N/x]C
(EN =)
Γ , x : N ` C = C ′ Γ ` L = L′ : [0/x]C
Γ , x : N, y : C ` M = M ′ : [s x/x]C Γ ` N = N ′ : N
Γ ` EN([x]C, L, [x, y]M,N) = EN([x]C ′, L′, [x, y]M ′,N ′) : [N/x]C
(EN0)
Γ , x : N ` C type Γ ` L : [0/x]C
Γ , x : N, y : C ` M : [s x/x]C
Γ ` EN([x]C, L, [x, y]M, 0) = L : [0/x]C
(EN s)
Γ , x : N ` C type Γ ` L : [0/x]C
Γ , x : N, y : C ` M : [s x/x]C Γ ` N : N
Γ ` EN([x]C, L, [x, y]M, sN)
= [N/x, EN([x]C, L, [x, y]M,N)/y]M : [sN/x]C
(IndN)
Γ , x : N ` φ Prop Γ ` N : N
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [0/x]φ Γ , x : N ` Φ, φ ⇒ [s x/x]φ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [N/x]φ
A.1.3. Pairs
Γ ` A type Γ ` B type
Γ ` A× B type
Γ ` A = A′ Γ ` B = B′
Γ ` (A× B) = (A′ × B′)
Γ ` M : A Γ ` N : B
Γ ` (M,N)A×B : A× B
Γ ` A = A′ Γ ` B = B′
Γ ` M = M ′ : A Γ ` N = N ′ : B
Γ ` (M,N)A×B = (M ′,N ′)A′×B′ : A× B
Γ ` M : A× B
Γ ` piA×B1 (M) : A
Γ ` A = A′ Γ ` B = B′
Γ ` M = M ′ : A× B
Γ ` piA×B1 (M) = piA
′×B′
1 (M
′) : A
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Γ ` M : A× B
Γ ` piA×B2 (M) : B
Γ ` A = A′ Γ ` B = B′
Γ ` M = M ′ : A× B
Γ ` piA×B2 (M) = piA
′×B′
2 (M
′) : B
Γ ` M : A Γ ` N : B
Γ ` piA×B1 ((M,N)A×B) = M : A
Γ ` M : A Γ ` N : B
Γ ` piA×B2 ((M,N)A×B) = N : B
(eta×)
Γ , z : A× B ` φ Prop Γ ` M : A× B
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [(piA×B1 (M), piA×B2 (M))/z]φ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [M/z]φ
A.1.4. Functions
Γ ` A type Γ ` B type
Γ ` A→ B type
Γ ` A = A′ Γ ` B = B′
Γ ` (A→ B) = (A′ → B′)
Γ , x : A ` M : B
Γ ` (λx : A.M : B) : A→ B
Γ ` A = A′ Γ ` B = B′
Γ , x : A ` M = M ′ : B
Γ ` (λx : A.M : B)
= (λx : A′.M ′ : B′) : A→ B
Γ ` M : A→ B Γ ` N : A
Γ ` M(N)A→B : B
Γ ` A = A′ Γ ` B = B′
Γ ` M = M ′ : A→ B Γ ` N = N ′ : A
Γ ` M(N)A→B = M ′(N ′)A′→B′ : B
Γ , x : A ` M : B Γ ` N : A
Γ ` (λx : A.M : B)(N)A→B = [N/x]M : [N/x]B
(eta→)
Γ , z : A→ B ` φ Prop Γ ` M : A→ B
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [λx : A.M(x) : B/z]φ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [M/z]φ
A.1.5. Typed sets
Γ ` A type
Γ ` Set (A) type
Γ ` A = A′
Γ ` Set (A) = Set (A′)
Γ , x : A ` P prop
Γ ` {x : A | P} : Set (A)
Γ ` A = A′ Γ , x : A ` P = P ′
Γ ` {x : A | P} = {x : A′ | P ′} : Set (A)
Γ ` M : A Γ ` N : Set (A)
Γ ` M∈ˆAN prop
Γ ` A = A′
Γ ` M = M ′ : A Γ ` N = N ′ : Set (A)
Γ ` (M∈ˆAN) = (M ′∈ˆA′N ′)
Γ ` M : A Γ , x : A ` P prop
Γ ` (M∈ˆA{x : A | P}) = [M/x]P
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A.1.6. The type universe
Γ ` valid
Γ ` U type
Γ ` M : U
Γ ` T (M) type
Γ ` M = M ′ : U
Γ ` T (M) = T (M ′)
Γ ` valid
Γ ` Nˆ : U
Γ ` valid
Γ ` T (Nˆ) = N
Γ ` M : U Γ ` N : U
Γ ` M×ˆN : U
Γ ` M = M ′ : U Γ ` N = N ′ : U
Γ ` (M×ˆM ′) = (N×ˆN ′) : U
Γ ` M : U Γ ` N : U
Γ ` T (M×ˆN) = T (M)× T (N)
A.1.7. Classical predicate logic
Γ ` valid
Γ ` ⊥ Prop
Γ ` φ Prop Γ ` Φ ⇒ ⊥
Γ ` Φ ⇒ φ
Γ ` φ Prop Γ ` ψ Prop
Γ ` φ ⊃ ψ Prop
Γ ` φ = φ′ Γ ` ψ = ψ ′
Γ ` (φ ⊃ ψ) = (φ′ ⊃ ψ ′)
Γ ` Φ, φ ⇒ ψ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ φ ⊃ ψ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ φ ⊃ ψ Γ ` Φ ⇒ φ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ ψ
(DN)
Γ ` Φ ⇒ ¬(¬φ)
Γ ` Φ ⇒ φ
Γ , x : A ` φ Prop
Γ ` ∀x : A.φ Prop
Γ ` A = A′ Γ , x : A ` φ = φ′
Γ ` (∀x : A.φ) = (∀x : A′.φ′)
Γ ` φ1 Prop · · · Γ ` φn Prop
Γ , x : A ` φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ ψ
Γ ` φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ ∀x : A.ψ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ ∀x : A.φ Γ ` M : A
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [M/x]φ
A.1.8. The propositional universe
Γ ` P prop
Γ ` V (P) Prop
Γ ` P = Q
Γ ` V (P) = V (Q )
Γ ` valid
Γ ` ⊥ˆ prop
Γ ` valid
Γ ` V (⊥ˆ) = ⊥
Γ ` P prop Γ ` Q prop
Γ ` P⊃ˆQ prop
Γ ` P = P ′ Γ ` Q = Q ′
Γ ` (P⊃ˆQ ) = (P ′⊃ˆQ ′)
Γ ` P prop Γ ` Q prop
Γ ` V (P⊃ˆQ ) = (V (P) ⊃ V (Q ))
Γ , x : T (M) ` P prop
Γ ` ∀ˆx : M.P prop
Γ ` M = M ′ : U Γ , x : T (M) ` P = P ′
Γ ` (∀ˆx : M.P) = (∀ˆx : M ′.P ′)
Γ , x : T (M) ` P prop
Γ ` V (∀ˆx : M.P) = (∀x : T (M).V (P))
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A.1.9. Equality
Γ ` M1 : T (N) Γ ` M2 : T (N)
Γ ` (M1 =N M2) Prop
Γ ` N = N ′ : U
Γ ` M1 = M ′1 : T (N)
Γ ` M2 = M ′2 : T (A)
Γ ` (M1 =N M2) = (M ′1 =N M ′2)
Γ ` φ1 Prop · · · Γ ` φn Prop
Γ ` M : T (N)
Γ ` φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ M =N M
(subst)
Γ , x : T (N) ` φ Prop
Γ ` Φ ⇒ M1 =N M2 Γ ` Φ ⇒ [M1/x]φ
Γ ` Φ ⇒ [M2/x]φ
Γ ` M1 : T (N) Γ ` M2 : T (N)
Γ ` (M1=ˆNM2) prop
Γ ` M1 = M ′1 : T (N)
Γ ` M2 = M ′2 : T (N)
Γ ` (M1=ˆNM2) = (M ′1=ˆNM ′2)
Γ ` M1 : T (N) Γ ` M2 : T (N)
Γ ` V (M1=ˆNM2) = (M1 =N M2)
A.1.10. Differences from previous presentation
The above presentation differs from the one in [3] in a few respects. In that paper, we constructed LTTW within the logical
framework LF′. Here, we have presented LTTW as a separate, stand-alone formal system. The constant Peirce in [3] has been
replaced with the rule (DN), the constant I⇒ has been replaced with the rule (eta→), and the constant I× has been replaced
with (eta×).
It is not difficult to show that the two presentations are equivalent. These changes have been made in order to simplify
the definition of the interpretations in Section 5.
In [3], we introduced a proposition ‘prop’, and used the proofs of ‘prop’ as the names of the small propositions. We also
discussed the possibility of making ‘prop’ a type. In this paper, we have taken a neutral option: we have used a separate
judgement form Γ ` P prop. The systemwe present here can be embedded in both the system that has ‘prop’ a proposition,
and the system that has ‘prop’ a type. It can be shown that these two embeddings are conservative.
A.2. LTT0
The subsystem LTT0 is formed from LTTW by making the following changes.
1. Whenever the rules (EN), (EN =), (EN0) or (EN s) are used, the type Amust have the form T (K).
2. Whenever the rule (IndN) is used, the proposition φ must have the form V (P).
3. Whenever the rule (subst), (eta×) or (eta→) is used, then for every quantifier ∀x : A in the proposition φ, the type Amust
not contain the symbol U .
4. The following rule of deduction is added:
(P3)
Γ ` φ1 Prop · · · Γ ` φn Prop Γ ` M : N
Γ ` φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ ¬(0 =Nˆ sM)
A.3. LTT∗0
We say a proposition φ is analytic iff, for every quantifier ∀x : A in φ, either A ≡ T (M) for someM , or A ≡ Set (N).
The subsystem LTT0 is formed from LTTW by making the following changes.
1. Whenever the rules (EN), (EN =), (EN0) or (EN s) are used, the type Amust have the form T (K).
2. Whenever the rule (IndN) is used, the proposition φ must be analytic.
3. Whenever the rule (subst), (eta×) or (eta→) is used, the proposition φ must have the form V (P).
4. The rule of deduction (P3) is added.
Appendix B. Proof of the soundness theorems
We present here the proofs of two of the Soundness Theorems in this paper.
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B.1. Proof of Theorem 5.13
We begin by proving the following properties of our interpretation:
Lemma B.1. If∆ ⊆ ∆′, then [[A]]∆ ⊆ [[A]]∆′ and (∼A∆) ⊆ (∼A∆′).
Proof. The proof is by induction on A. 
Lemma B.2.
1. LetM be a term and X an expression ofAn+1. Let v′ = v[x := (|M|)v]. If (|M|)v is defined, and (|X |)v′ is defined, then (|[M/x]X |)v
is defined, and (|[M/x]X |)v = (|X |)v′ .
2. Given a term M ofAn and expression X ofAn+1, we have [M/x](|X |)v ' (|X |)u where, for all y ∈ dom v, u(y) ≡ [M/x]v(y).
3. If (|M|)v and (|X |)v[x:=x] are defined, then (|[M/x]X |)v is defined, and (|[M/x]X |)v ≡ [(|M|)v/x](|X |)v[x:=x]
4. If v(x) = v′(x) for all x ∈ FV (M), then (|X |)v = (|X |)v′ .
5. Suppose (∆,Φ, v) |= φ. If∆ ⊆ ∆′,Φ ⊆ Φ ′, and v(x) = v′(x) for all x ∈ FV (φ), then (∆′,Φ ′, v′) |= φ.
6. (∆,Φ, v) |= [M/x]φ iff (∆,Φ, [M/x]v) |= φ.
Proof. Part 1 is proven by induction on X , and part 2 by induction on N . Part 3 follows simply from the first two. The
remaining parts are proven by induction on X or φ. 
Theorem 5.13 is now proven by induction on derivations. We deal with five cases here.
1. Consider the case of the rule of deduction
Γ , x : A ` M : B Γ ` N : A
Γ ` (λx : A.(M : B))(N)A→B = [N/x]M : B
By the induction hypothesis, we have
∆, x : A `n (|M|)v[x:=x] : B, ∆ `n (|N|)v : A
and we must show∆ `n (|(λx : A.M)(N)|)v = (|[N/x]M|)v : B.
Suppose d(A→ B) ≤ n. Then we have
∆ `n (λx : A.(|M|)v[x:=x])((|N|)v) = [(|N|)v/x](|M|)v[x:=x] : B.
By the two claims above, we have [(|N|)v/x](|M|)v[x:=x] ≡ (|[N/x]M|)v and the required judgement follows.
Suppose now d(A→ B) = n+ 1. We must show∆ ` (|(λx : A.M)(N)|)v = (|[M/x]N|)v : B But
(|(λx : A.M)(N)|)v ≡ (|λx : A.M|)v@(|N|)v
≡ 〈x, (|M|)v[x:=x]〉@(|N|)v
≡ [(|N|)v/x](|M|)v[x:=x]
≡ (|[M/x]N|)v
and so the required judgement is
∆ ` [(|N|)v/x](|M|)v[x:=x] = [(|N|)v/x](|M|)v[x:=x] : B
which is derivable inAn.
2. Consider the rule of deduction
Γ ` Ψ ⇒ ∀x : A.ψ Γ ` M : A
Γ ` Ψ ⇒ [M/x]ψ
Suppose (Φ,∆, v) satisfies each member of Ψ . Then (Φ,∆, v) |= ∀x : A.ψ . We also have (|M|)v ∈ [[A]]v∆.
If d(∀x : A.ψ) ≤ n, then we have∆ ` Φ ⇒ ∀x : A.(|ψ |)v and∆ ` (|M|)v : A, hence∆ ` Φ ⇒ [(|M|)v/x](|ψ |)v[x:=x], and
this is the judgement required by Lemma B.2.3.
If d(∀x : A.ψ) = n + 1, then we have (Φ,∆, v[x := (|M|)v]) |= ψ . Hence (Φ,∆, v) |= [M/x]ψ by Lemma B.2.6 as
required.
3. Consider the rule of deduction
Γ ` ψ Prop Γ ` Ψ ⇒ ⊥
Γ ` Ψ ⇒ ψ
For this case, we need the result:
If∆ ` Φ ⇒ ⊥ then (∆,Φ, v) |= ψ for every proposition ψ ofAn+1.
This is proven by induction on ψ .
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4. Consider the rule of deduction
(DN)
Γ ` Ψ ⇒ ¬¬ψ
Γ ` Ψ ⇒ ψ
For this case, we need the result:
If (∆,Φ, v) |= ¬¬φ then (∆,Φ, v) |= φ.
If d(φ) ≤ n, we have
∆ ` Φ ⇒ ¬¬(|ψ |)v
∴ ∆ ` Φ ⇒ (|ψ |)v. (DN)
If d(φ) = n+ 1 and φ ≡ ψ ⊃ χ , we have that
(∆,Φ, v) |= ¬¬(ψ ⊃ χ). (B.1)
Suppose∆1 ⊇ ∆,Φ1 ⊇ Φ , and
(∆1,Φ1, v) |= ψ. (B.2)
We must show (∆1,Φ1, v) |= χ . By the induction hypothesis, it is sufficient to prove (∆1,Φ1, v) |= ¬¬χ . So suppose
∆2 ⊇ ∆1,Φ2 ⊇ Φ1, and
(∆2,Φ2, v) |= ¬χ. (B.3)
We must show (∆2,Φ2, v) |= ⊥. By (B.1), it is sufficient to prove that (∆2,Φ2, v) |= ¬(ψ ⊃ χ). So suppose∆3 ⊇ ∆2,
Φ3 ⊇ Φ2, and
(∆3,Φ3, v) |= ψ ⊃ χ. (B.4)
We have (∆3,Φ3, v) |= ψ by Lemma B.2.5, so (∆3,Φ3, v) |= χ , and hence (∆3,Φ3, v) |= ⊥ by (B.3), as required.
The case d(φ) = n+ 1 and φ ≡ ∀x : A.ψ is similar.
5. Consider the case of the rule of deduction (IndN):
Γ , x : N ` V (P) Prop Γ ` N : N
Γ ` Φ ⇒ V ([0/x]P) Γ , x : N ` Φ, V (P)⇒ V ([s x/x]P)
Γ ` Φ ⇒ V ([N/x]P)
This follows by applying (IndN) inAn. Note that it is important here that V (P)must be a small proposition.
B.2. Proof of Theorem 5.25
We begin by proving
Lemma B.3. If∆ ⊆ ∆′, then [[A]]v∆ ⊆ [[A]]v∆′ and (∼A∆v) ⊆ (∼A∆′v).
Proof. Similar to Lemma B.1. 
We prove that Lemma B.2 holds for our new translation. The proof is similar.
Theorem 5.25 is now proven by induction on derivations. We deal with one case here: the rule of deduction
(EN s)
Γ , x : N ` T (K) type Γ ` L : T ([0/x]K)
Γ , x : N, y : T (K) ` M : T ([s x/x]K) Γ ` N : N
Γ ` EN([x]T (K), L, [x, y]M, sN)
= [N/x, EN([x]T (K), L, [x, y]M,N)/y]M : T ([sN/x]K)
Let v be a ∆-valuation of Γ . Inverting, the derivation includes Γ , x : N ` K : U , and so the induction hypothesis gives us
(|K |)v[x:=J] ∈ S whenever∆ ` J : N. Let us define
S(J) = (|K |)v[x:=J]
DJ ≡ decodeS(J)
CJ ≡ codeS(J)
F(J) ≡ EN([x]T (K), L, [x, y]M, J).
We have the following chain of equalities provable in Tω:
(|F(sN)|)v ≡ Ds(|N|)(R(C0((|L|)), [x, y]Cs x((|M|)v[x:=x,y:=Dx(y)]), s(|N|)v))
= Ds(|N|)(Cs(|N|)((|M|)v[x:=(|N|),y:=(|F(N)|)]))
= (|M|)v[x:=(|N|),y:=(|F(N)|)]
≡ (|[N/x, F(N)/y]M|)v
as required.
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